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This thesis assesses whether it is profitable to build a natural gas infrastructure solution in the Barents 
Sea, under reasonable assumptions about costs and revenues. In order to answer this question we have 
looked at the resource base in the Barents Sea and the probability of new discoveries, how the global 
market for natural gas will develop, at what cost the oil and gas companies will be able to recover the 
resources, and what type of infrastructure that suits the region best and how it could be financed.  
 
Our findings indicate that a natural gas pipeline would be a profitable solution, while other solutions are 
either not technically viable or not profitable. The proven resource base alone is not sufficient to justify 
a pipeline development, but the likelihood of new discoveries is high if exploration activity is increased.  
We found that exploration has been limited as a consequence of lacking infrastructure, meaning that 
there is a timing paradox concerning development of the region. If there is no infrastructure solution in 
place, there will not be enough exploration, and if there is not enough exploration, there will not be 
enough discoveries to justify the infrastructure development.  
 
We have found that a project finance approach could have solved the timing paradox, if oil and gas 
companies were willing to contractually commit to pay for transportation rights beyond what their 
current discoveries will justify. As a project finance approach allows for high level of risk allocation 
between project participants, it is possible to divide project risk within the capital structure so that the 
infrastructure investment offers an attractive opportunity for various investors. We have found that a 
pipeline could be financed by dividing the risk between debt holders, infrastructure funds and oil and 
gas companies, so that all parties are able to achieve a risk-reward profile that match their preferences. 
However, we found that oil and gas companies are not willing to make these kinds of contractual 
commitments. This means that the pipeline project will have to carry more risk, making high leverage, as 
suggested in our project finance model, challenging.  
 
To solve the timing paradox we thus conclude that government intervention is necessary. We find that 
state financing of the infrastructure is a better solution then further incentivizing exploration. State 
financing might be viewed as selective business support and is consequently politically difficult.   
 
Abstract 
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In 2011, the Norwegian government presented a White Paper, titled “An Industry for the Future – About 
the Petroleum Industry”. This paper outlined ambitious targets for the industry, and stated that the 
main target of the Norwegian petroleum policy should be “to facilitate a profitable production of oil- 
and gas resources in a long run perspective” (The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011, p.6). 
Increasing recovery rates from fields in production, developing proven resources, and finding more 
resources are critical challenges emphasized in this paper.  
 
The first two challenges relate primarily to the mature and developed regions of the continental shelf, 
notably The North and Norwegian Sea. In contrast, when tackling the third challenge of finding more 
resources, the Norwegian government and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) envisage the 
Barents Sea as a key region (The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011). Although uncertain, 
assessments show that the Barents Sea, together with deep-water areas of the Norwegian Sea, has the 
greatest probability of new discoveries on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). It is expected that the 
majority of the undiscovered petroleum deposits in the Barents Sea contain natural gas (Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, 2015a) 
 
The Barents Sea has experienced much attention in recent years due to the high expectations for the 
region. In the 22nd licensing round in 2012, 72 out of 86 blocks were in the Barents Sea. On January 20, 
2015 Tord Lien, the Minister of Petroleum and Energy, announced the 23rd licensing round. This round 
had 54 of 57 blocks in the Barents Sea region. Particularly interesting in the 23rd round was the opening 
of the Barents Sea Southeast (and Jan Mayen-region) for mapping and exploration of potential 
petroleum deposits (Eriksen, 2015). To secure the exploration activity envisaged under the 22nd and 23rd 
licensing round, the commercial viability of the natural gas resources has to be evaluated.   
 
Despite the ambitions for the region, further developments of the gas resources might prove to be 
commercially challenging. So far, only a limited number of the proven gas discoveries have been 
developed. The lack of an infrastructure solution enabling transportation of natural gas to the markets is 
a key issue for making the gas resources commercial (Anker, 2013). There are no proven natural gas 
fields in the Barents Sea large enough to justify the necessary investments for an infrastructure solution 
1 Introduction 
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single-handily (Gassco, 2014, p.36). Without relevant infrastructure in place, it is likely that future 
discoveries in the Barents Sea will also be left undeveloped, an issue which will be addressed later in the 
thesis.  
In addition to the amount of recoverable resources, the viability of an infrastructure solution will 
depend on the market price and market conditions for natural gas. For the development of the gas 
resources to be profitable, it is important that the natural gas markets are attractive enough to justify 
the costs of both infrastructure and field developments. Consequently, to further discuss the economic 
viability of an infrastructure solution, a thorough analysis of the natural gas market is required. 
Addressing the issues concerning the potential development of the natural gas resources in the Barents 
Sea will be crucial for a successfully achieving the targets of the petroleum policy.  The remoteness of 
the Barents Sea and the changing market dynamics makes it appropriate to discuss various 
infrastructure solutions. All possible solutions will contain large capex-requirements in infrastructure, 
collaboration between several licenses to realize investments, and a large share of marginal resources. 
Alternative models to finance the gas infrastructure investments may be needed to maximize the value 
creation from the gas resources in the Barents Sea. (Gassco, 2014, s.36). 
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2.1 Research Question 
The research question this thesis seeks to answer is: 
Is it profitable to build an infrastructure solution in the Barents Sea under reasonable assumptions about 
costs and revenues? 
The following four sub questions must be answered to thoroughly address this research question: 
1. Resource base:  Is the resource base and probability of new discoveries in the Barents Sea 
sufficient to justify further developments in the area? 
2. Market conditions: How will the market for natural gas develop, and will the price of natural gas 
be high enough to justify further developments in the Barents Sea?     
3. Cost of field development: At what cost will the natural gas companies be able to recover the 
gas resources in the Barents Sea? 
4. Infrastructure: What type of infrastructure solutions would be appropriate and how should the 
investment in infrastructure be financed?        
2.2 Limitations 
To ensure independence in the assessments of the resource estimations and potential in the Barents 
Sea, it could be argued that we should have performed our own calculations of the resource potential in 
the region. However, we believe that NPD’s analysis provides the necessary independence in their 
estimates. The NPD is a government specialist directorate with the objective of “creating the greatest 
possible values for society from the oil and gas activities by means of prudent resource management” 
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, u.d.). We believe that the NPD by no means have an incentive to 
provide inaccurate information concerning the resource potential.  
 
Calculating the cost of field development is a challenging exercise, due to the complexity and unique 
characteristics of each field development. Consequently, the field development costs are generalized 
based on historical data from similar gas field projects.  
 
2 Research Question and Limitations 
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With regard to the choice of infrastructure, the considerations are limited to technologies that have 
been proven on a commercial scale. This is primarily pipeline transport and sea transport of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG). Sea transportation in the form of compressed natural gas (CNG) and gas to liquids 
(GTL) is also discussed, although only a limited number similar of projects utilize these methods.  
 
When assessing the potential revenues associated with developing natural gas resources in the Barents 
Sea, the analysis is limited to the revenues generated by the sale of dry gas. Thus, the potential extra 
revenue generated from production of natural gas liquids (NGL), which is a byproduct in some gas fields, 
is not included. In addition the thesis does not look at the potential increase in oil production, resulting 
from oil fields with associated gas having an easier evacuation solution for the gas that is mixed in the oil 
when it is taken out of the ground. 
Throughout Norway’s history as a natural gas exporter, expansions of the transportation network has 
been based on large discoveries, securing utilization of new infrastructure developments (Pedersen & 
Nygård, 2005). Consequently, the infrastructure has been developed in parallel with the resources to 
which it is connected. The management and governance of the transportation network, and the sales of 
natural gas, has however evolved over the course of Norwegian oil and gas history. 
3.1 1973 - 2001 
The first transportation of natural gas from the Norwegian Continental Shelf took place in 1977. The gas 
was transported from the Ekofisk-field via the pipeline Norpipe to a receiving terminal in Emden, 
Germany. The Phillips Group initiated the construction in 1973, after selling the Ekofisk-gas on long-term 
contracts to buyers on the European Continent. The price-mechanisms, under which the contracts were 
negotiated, were based on indexing the price of gas to the price of heating oil for a period between 20-
30 years. In addition to the price following movements in the oil prices, the contracts had standardized 
take-or-pay clauses1. (Norsk Oljemuseum, 2010) 
                                                          
1  Take-or-pay clauses require a purchaser to pay for a minimum quantity of goods or services, whether or 
not those goods or services are taken. (Holland & Ashley, 2013) 
3 Historical Development of Norwegian Gas Resources 
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Figure 1 - Timeline of the historical development of Norwegian Gas Resources 
As more fields were discovered in the early developments of the NCS, more pipelines were constructed. 
This provided the necessary link for the natural gas to reach the European markets. In these early stages, 
the license holders of the fields sold the natural gas on field depletion contracts. Considering the relative 
modest size of the natural gas resources of these fields, selling all the gas in one chunk posed few 
problems. (Pedersen & Nygård, 2005) 
 
This changed in 1979, when the Troll field was discovered. Today, Troll is the cornerstone of Norwegian 
gas production and the largest gas discovery in Norwegian oil and gas history. The field holds roughly 40 
per cent of the proven gas resources on the continental shelf (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2014). 
Although enormous, it was difficult to make Troll commercially interesting when discovered, as it was 
considered only marginally profitable. The vast resource size and the complexity concerning field 
development, called for a new approach related to the sale of the gas. Unlike the early discoveries, the 
Troll gas was sold in portions to large European utilities. The emergence of European gas markets, The 
Cold War, and the desire for independence from Soviet gas deliveries made the contracts lucrative for 
the license holders (Pedersen & Nygård, 2005).  
 
After finalizing the sale of the Troll gas in the mid-1980s, the Norwegian government established two 
committees: Gassforhandlingsutvalget (GFU) and Det Norske Gassforsyningsutvalget (FU). The GFU was 
established to create a monopoly in the sale and marketing of the Norwegian natural gas resources. GFU 
consisted of representatives from Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Saga Petroleum (acquired by Norsk Hydro in 
1999). After the establishment of the GFU it was no longer allowed for the various field licenses-holders 
to market and sell their own gas. The GFU negotiated "field-neutral" sale contracts, meaning that 
neither the GFU nor the buyer of the gas knew which field the gas was coming from. The Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy assigned which fields that should fulfil the delivery of the gas. The allocation of 
the gas deliveries was performed regularly through allocation rounds, based on recommendations from 
the FU.  The intention of the GFU was to optimize the resource management by ensuring that the most 
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profitable reserves were developed first, and that the corresponding pipelines and receiving terminals 
were built in the most cost efficient way. (Pedersen & Nygård, 2005) 
 
While the GFU were in charge of sales and marketing, the FU worked on the exploration, development, 
and exploitation of the gas fields and the connected pipeline system. The GFU/FU-system secured a 
coordinated development of the Norwegian gas resources and the necessary infrastructure needed to 
transport and refine the gas.  
3.2 2001 – 2015 
The GFU proved to be a successful establishment, and negotiated on behalf of the license-holders and 
the Norwegian Government, very lucrative prices of Norwegian natural gas. However, since the GFU was 
a monopoly it experienced much scrutiny from both the buyers and the European Union. The European 
Parliament began to form a new directive as a result of what the EU and gas buyers perceived as 
unreasonable prices. The Gas Market Directive, ratified on 12.august 2000, involved a liberalization 
(devolution) of the European gas market and a gradual dissolving of the gas-monopolies spread across 
Europe. In Norway, the directive was implemented in September 2001 and the GFU and FU were 
consequently terminated. The license-holders were again on their own in terms of selling and marketing 
their own gas.  
 
To ensure operational efficiency after the GFU/FU system was terminated, the Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy established a new company, Gassco AS, to manage operations of the pipeline 
system on May 14 2001 (The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2001). The idea when forming Gassco 
was to secure neutrality in the transportation system, fair treatment of the shippers in the transport- 
and processing facilities, and facilitate further developments of the gas transport system (Gassco, 
2014b).  
 
From 2001 to 2003, the transportation system was organized as partnerships/joint-ventures where each 
individual pipeline or terminal was a separate entity. The shippers who transported the gas negotiated 
conditions of carriage with each individual partnership in order to bring the gas to the markets. To 
ensure a more effective management of the transportation network, the different partnerships 
established on January 1, 2003 a collective partnership called Gassled (Pedersen & Nygård, 2005). 
Gassled became a consortium of larger oil- and gas-companies that now owned the transportation 
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system. The idea behind creating a single owner was a simpler transportation system that facilitated a 
better exploitation of the petroleum resources. Gassco, who started the operations of the pipelines in 
2001, continued as sole operational manager of the pipelines, processing facilities, and receiving 
terminals.  
 
Today, the transportation system covers 7980 kilometer of pipelines, three processing facilities and six 
receiving terminals. At the processing facilities the rich gas from the offshore reserves is refined into 
natural gas liquids (NGL) and dry-gas. Ships transport the NGL while the dry-gas is transported through 
the pipeline-system to receiving terminals in Europe. The six receiving terminals consist of two in 
Germany, one in Belgium, one in France and two in the UK (Gassco, 2014b). 
 
Figure 2 - Current pipeline infrastructure on the NCS (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2015f) 
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From 2003 until 2010, large oil and gas (O&G) companies with operational licenses on the NCS owned 
Gassled. However, due to low returns associated with owning shares in the transportation network, the 
O&G companies initiated in 2010 a process that involved selling their stakes in Gassled. The Gassled 
stakes were sold to reputable international infrastructure funds with return preferences consistent with 
owning regulated infrastructure assets (Gammons, Hern, Haug, Grayburn, & Pu, 2013). The O&G 
companies sold their stakes to free capital for projects with higher expected returns, which were more 
closely related to their core business.    
 
Figure 3 - Overview of the 2010 Gassled transaction 
3.3 Commercial Difficulties Regarding Further Developments  
3.3.1 The Timing Paradox 
Although the natural gas potential in the Barents Sea looks promising, some O&G companies are 
hesitant to explore pure natural gas prospects the region (Rummelhoff, interview, 03.02.15). The reason 
being high development costs and a fear that the resources found can be left stranded due to a lack of 
infrastructure. A small or medium sized gas field does not generate enough revenue to justify the cost of 
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developing the necessary infrastructure to bring the resources to the market (Torvund, interview, 
04.04.15). Total EP’s Norvarg field is an example this. Found in 2011, the field, expected to contain 30 
BCM, was returned to the Norwegian government in 2014. Total commented that the lack of 
infrastructure was a key reason for why they choose to not further pursue the license (Taraldsen, 2013).  
 
This shows that future developments of natural gas fields are likely to depend on collaboration with 
several other licenses in order to share the costs of a common infrastructure solution. However, this 
creates a first mover disadvantage in exploring pure natural gas prospects, as O&G companies have an 
incentive to postpone exploration until the proven resource base is higher and the likelihood of a shared 
infrastructure is greater.           
 
Starting to develop infrastructure when there still is uncertainty concerning whether it is enough 
commercial resources to support the investment, has proven to be a risky exercise. The 480 km long 
Polarled pipeline that will connect Aasta Hansteen, located 300 km west of Bodø, to the existing pipeline 
system, was initially supposed to be supported by several other fields (Taraldsen, 2014). The projects 
Linnorm, Kristin and Asterix were intended to connect to the pipeline further south, but all these 
projects are now either cancelled or postponed. The ownership in Polarled was divided between the 
partners based on the expected volumes they would require. The result being that the partners of Aasta 
Hansteen will account for 100 per cent of the throughput, while their ownership in Polarled will be 
about 64 per cent. The table below illustrates the ownership structure in the two projects.  
   
 Ownership share (%) 
  Polarled Joint Venture Aasta Hansteen 
Statoil 50.33 % 75 % 
OMW 9.07 % 15 % 
ConocoPhillips 4.45 % 10 % 
Petoro 11.95 %  
Shell 9.02 %  
Total 5.11 %  
RWE Dea 4.79 %  
Edison 2.40 %  
Maersk Oil 2.40 %  
Gdf Suez 0.49 %  
 
Table 1 - Overview of Aasta Hansteen and Polarled ownership (Statoil, 2013) 
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The result of this is that either the tariffs need to be set 56 per cent (100/64) higher than initially 
planned, or the pipeline will yield a lower return than intended. Statoil, OMW and ConocoPhillips will 
argue that the tariffs should be based on the volumes that were expected when starting the pipeline 
project, while Petoro and the other owners will argue that the tariff should be set so that the pipeline 
yields the 7 per cent government target for its investors. The final outcome is still uncertain. 
     
The situation in the Barents Sea creates a timing paradox. Before the O&G companies feel certain that 
there will be an infrastructure solution in place, they will be hesitant to explore the region. Likewise, 
funding new infrastructure will prove difficult until there is absolute certainty that there is enough 
commercial resources to support the infrastructure. No infrastructure - no exploration, no exploration - 
not enough resources to justify the infrastructure. In other words, if the infrastructure is not built the 
resources may never be found and the profitability of a new pipeline or LNG train will remain unknown.  
 
In light of the discussion presented above we have focused this paper on addressing whether the timing 
paradox is possible to overcome, and more importantly, if the cost of overcoming this problem creates a 
desirable outcome. 
In order to answer our research problem presented in subchapter 2.1, the thesis is divided into a 
synthesis and an analytical part. The synthesis seeks to answer the first three sub-questions regarding 
the resource potential, the market for natural gas and the cost of field development. The analytical part 
relates to the fourth sub-question and looks at how a potential infrastructure solution could be 
financed. In addition, the thesis provides an overview on the theoretical framework used in the 
analytical part.  
4.1 The Synthesis 
A multitude of sources make up the foundation for the research concerning the resource potential, the 
natural gas markets, and the cost of field development. The synthesis is based on both primary and 
secondary data sources.  
4 Methodology  
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4.1.1 Primary Data 
The primary data used in the synthesis is semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and interest 
organizations on the continental shelf. Semi-structured interviews are non-standardized interviews used 
for exploratory research (Saunders, Lews, & Thornhill, 2003). The researcher has a pre-determined list of 
subjects and questions to be covered, although these may vary depending on the interview-respondent. 
Given the exploratory nature of our study, it was important to let the respondent present their 
perspectives and thoughts on the research question. Semi-structured interviews provided us with the 
opportunity to acquire in-depth knowledge on topics the respondent felt relevant to cover, and further 
build our thesis on these responses. An important part of the semi-structured interviews is the interview 
guide.  
4.1.1.1 The Interview Guide2 
The interview guide was developed after carefully reading available information relevant for our thesis. 
A general introduction about what we wanted to examine was sent to target companies and 
organizations a few weeks prior to the interviews, which enabled us to get in touch with people 
possessing key competence in our area of interest. Spending time on understanding how the natural gas 
industry works before developing the interview guide, allowed us to focus the interviews on the key 
discussions related to our topic of research. The first round of interviews were based on the same focal 
questions, but the focus was adjusted depending on responses from the interviewees. After working 
with the information collected in the first round of interviews, we found a second round of 
conversations with the present infrastructure owners and DNB relevant. The interview with the DNB-
representatives is only used in the analytical part of the thesis, as this was a discussion exclusively 
related to financing the infrastructure.        
4.1.1.2 The Reliability of the Primary Data 
Bias constitute the main concern for the reliability of the semi-structured interviews (Saunders, Lews, & 
Thornhill, 2003). The first bias to consider is the interviewer bias, which assesses how the behaviour of 
the interviewer may influence the responses.  Commenting on personal bias is always difficult. Yet, 
when considering the well-prepared interview guide and the purpose of the interview, we believe that 
interviewer-bias was limited. 
  
                                                          
2 The interview guide is available in the appendix 
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Response bias make up the second source of bias in the semi-structured interview. Response bias occurs 
prevalently in semi-structured interviews as the purpose of the interviews is to seek explanations 
(Saunders, Lews, & Thornhill, 2003). Therefore, it is important to consider the personal opinions of the 
respondents when creating the interview guide. Careful planning increased our knowledge of the topics 
prior to the interviews, and as the respondents were aware that we had a strong factual understanding, 
this arguably increased the credibility of the data. 
4.1.2 Secondary Data 
Like most research, we needed to begin with extensive literature review of earlier studies on our topic 
of research. By reading and interpreting the secondary data, we acquired knowledge on the topics we 
wanted to research in the synthesis. The national and international importance of the topics covered 
has resulted in a number of studies presenting useful information for answering the research question. 
Considering the magnitude of available data and information, one of the main challenges in the 
synthesis was to refine the information collected, so that it could be presented in a concise manner.  
 
The secondary data used in the synthesis primarily consists of published reports and statistics from 
governmental and intergovernmental agencies, published research by accredited academic institutions, 
and published reports and statistics from industry associations and corporations. 
 
Most tables and figures presented, both in the synthesis and analytical part, has been created for the 
sole purpose of this thesis, and rely on information from a large number of different sources. For these 
tables and figures, a detailed list of sources and assumptions can be found in the appendix. Figures that 
rely on a limited number of sources are referenced directly in the caption.   
4.1.2.1 The Reliability of the Secondary Data 
When analyzing the secondary data it is important to bear in mind potential biases in the data. If the 
secondary data collected was collected for a different purpose than the intention of this paper, it is 
important to assess the data critically so that potential biases are avoided. Once the secondary data is 
used in the thesis, the reliability of the data becomes our responsibility (Cooper & Schindler, 2001). In 
our analysis, we were extra cautious for such biases when reading industry reports and statistics from 
industry associations and corporations, as these might lack neutrality. Most of the data collected by 
international organizations, governments and academic institutions are of high quality and reliable as 
they are collected and complied by experts using rigorous methods (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2010).  
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4.2 The Analytical Part  
In contrast to the synthesis, this part of thesis mainly builds on our ability to perform an independent 
analysis by applying financial economic theory and the information given from the synthesis. 
Consequently, this part provides an introduction to the theoretical frameworks relevant for the analysis. 
Relevant theory is selected by assessing if the theory allows for a deeper, and more holistic insight of the 
problem. As we look at whether project finance can provide advantages compared to corporate finance 
for the potential infrastructure development, Modigliani and Millers theory on capital structure has 
been discussed.   
In this chapter we will look at whether the resource base and probability of new discoveries is sufficient 
to justify further natural gas developments in the Barents Sea. We will start with an introduction that 
emphasize why the Barents Sea has become a relevant region for future natural gas developments.   
5.1 The Norwegian Continental Shelf Today 
The oil and gas industry in Norway is in a different stage today than just 10-15 years ago. As depicted by 
figure 4, the overall production of petroleum resources reached its peak around 2004-2005. The 
production of crude oil had already peaked a few years earlier in 2000. In contrast, the production of 
natural gas keeps increasing. Currently, crude oil and natural gas contribute an equal share in terms of 
total production, measured in million standard cubic meter oil equivalents (MSm3 o.e.). Looking forward, 
this relationship will continue to skew, as natural gas captures an increasing share of total production 
output. Estimates also predict that the natural gas will be greater than oil in terms of export value, but 
this prediction is dependent on the future prices of oil and gas (Ytreberg, 2014). 
5 Resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
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Figure 4 - Historical production and export value of crude oil and gas on the NCS (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2015f)3 
(Statistics Norway, 2015) 
Even though the overall petroleum production peaked in 2004-2005, the total cost of production is still 
increasing. As figure 5 indicates, have the yearly field investments more than tripled in size since the 
production peak. Many factors contribute to this tenuous link between total production output and 
yearly field investments. The maturity of the explored regions on the continental shelf and the aging of 
producing fields contribute to the high investment acitivity. Enhanced recovery rates from fields in 
production also contribute to the increase in field investments. In addition, persistently high Brent-
prices the last 5-10 years have contributed to a lack of cost control in the petroleum sector. Due to the 
recent fall in the Brent-price, it is anticipated that there will be a slowdown in the field investments the 
coming 2-3 years. However, the fall in prices is only expected to have short-term effects. A substantial 
portion of the current field investments are in fields were the initial development took place in the 
1970s, 80s and 90s (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2014). These fields will in the coming years 
require additional investments in order to maintain production capability and technical integrity (Omre, 
interview, 05.02.15).  
                                                          
3 Future export value is based on current oil and natural gas prices 
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Figure 5 - Yearly field investments (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2015b) 
Falling total petroleum production and high expense levels miss the targets of the Government’s White 
Paper from 2011. In order to meet the objectives of a long run value creation in the petroleum sector, 
the production and activity levels on the NCS need to stabilize. According to the MPE, an aggressive 
focus on the following three areas is necessary to ensure a stable activity level in the petroleum sector 
(The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011): 
 Increased recovery rates and production lifetime of discovered fields and for fields already in 
production. 
 Continuing active exploration and research of both mature and immature areas that are open 
for petroleum activity.  
 Conduct opening processes for Jan Mayen and the part of the previously disputed area located 
west of the delimitation line in the Southern basin of the Barents Sea, which can provide a basis 
for renewed economic activity in Northern Norway.  
New solutions, where the benefits of enhanced and improved oil and gas recovery in existing fields 
exceed the total costs, will create value in the short to medium run. Exploration in mature areas of the 
continental shelf will also contribute in this time frame. Meanwhile discoveries of new commercial 
resources in new and less mature areas achieve the objectives of the petroleum policy in the medium to 
long term. (The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011) 
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5.2 Resource Base 
New discoveries on the continental shelf is necessary in order to achieve the objectives of the petroleum 
policy. Therefore, mapping of the discovered and undiscovered resources is a major priority for the oil 
industry. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), organized by the Norwegian government, is 
responsible for mapping the petroleum resources.  
 
According to the NPD, the total amount of recoverable petroleum resources on the NCS is roughly 14.1 
billion standard cubic meter oil equivalents (Sm3 o.e.) The total amount of recoverable petroleum 
resources is the sum of the already produced and sold resources and the remaining recoverable 
resources. Today, roughly 45 per cent (6.4 billion Sm3 o.e) of the total resource base is produced, while 
the outstanding 55 per cent (7.7 billion Sm3 o.e.) remain recoverable resources. (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, 2015a). 
 
According to the NPD, the remaining recoverable resources consist of (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, 2015a): 
 Reserves: remaining recoverable volumes of petroleum resources that the license-holder has 
decided to develop. This include both resources in projects where the Norwegian government 
have approved a plan for development and operation (PDO), and those that have not yet been 
approved. Reserves are classified in project status 1-34. 
 Contingent Resources: include petroleum deposits that are proven, but still subject to final 
development decision. The contingent resources are classified in project status 4, 5 and 7.5 
 Undiscovered Resources: consists of petroleum deposits that are probably present and 
recoverable, but have not yet been proven by drilling. These resources are classified in project 
status categories 8 and 9. 
 
                                                          
4 A list of the different classifications can be found in the appendix 
5 Category 6, resources whose recovery is not considered commercially viable, are not included in the resource 
accounts. 
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Figure 6 - Total resource on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2014) 
5.3 Undiscovered Resources 
5.3.1 Estimating the Undiscovered Resources 
In frontier areas, such as large parts of the Barents Sea, there is limited knowledge of geological 
conditions. In such little known areas, the uncertainty regarding the undiscovered resources will be 
related to (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013): 
 The total resources 
 The geographical distribution of the resources 
 The distribution of resources by size 
 The division between oil and gas resources 
In order to limit the uncertainty the NPD uses play analysis when mapping the undiscovered resources. 
A play is a geographically and stratigraphically delineated area (basin) where a specific set of geological 
factors such as reservoir rock, trap, mature source rock, and migrations paths exist (Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, 2013). These are preconditions for petroleum to be provable. A single play can 
consist of discoveries and fields, together with mapped and unmapped prospects.   
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Figure 7 - The relationship between basin, play, prospect and discovery/field 
The most fundamental element in a play is the prospects. A prospect is a potential petroleum deposit 
not yet drilled, but thoroughly mapped so that the quantity of possible producible resource volumes can 
be calculated (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013). The number of prospects and how much 
petroleum each prospect can produce determines the undiscovered resource estimates in a play. The 
play is unconfirmed until producible petroleum is proved. Uncertainty around the resource estimate 
must be accounted for if the play is unconfirmed. 
 
Despite almost 50 years of exploration activity and a substantial factual basis of geological conditions, 
the uncertainty about the size of undiscovered petroleum deposits in the plays remains high. The NPD 
calculates the probability of success in order to limit the uncertainty in the estimates.  The probability of 
success is a product of the play and the prospect probability (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013). 
The play and prospect probability denotes the likelihood for proving producible petroleum in a play and 
the probability of a prospect  to contain the calculated volume of petroleum, respectively.  
 
The probability of success measure the uncertainty in the producible petroleum estimates, and 
expresses the range of possible outcomes (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2015a). Less knowledge 
about a play or prospect increases the uncertainty around the estimated resources. When expressing 
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the estimated resources, the NPD specifies an uncertainty range: Low/P95 and High/P05. These 
uncertainty estimates are calculated using statistical methods, such as Monte Carlo simulations 
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2013). The high and low uncertainty estimates can then be 
described with statistical concepts.  The P95-estimates are the conservative/low estimations indicating 
that, given the assumptions in the analysis, there is a 95 per cent probability of at least finding resource 
volumes equal to or larger than these estimations. Similarly, the P05-estimate has a 5 per cent 
probability of finding results equal to or larger than the P05 estimates. The P-value indicates the risk in 
NPD’s estimations. In addition to the P95 and P05 estimates, the statistical resource analysis provides 
the expected value (P50). The expected value is the arithmetic mean of all the outcomes in the statistical 
distribution. It has the desired property that the expected value for various distributions can be summed 
to give a sum of distributions. 
5.3.2 Current Estimates 
Around 63 per cent (4.9 billion Sm3 o.e.) of all remaining recoverable resources has been proved by 
drilling. These resources are found in reserves or are contingent resources in discoveries and fields. The 
remaining 37 per cent is classified as undiscovered deposits by the NPD. The NPD assumes that these 
resources are probably present and recoverable, but unlike the reserves and contingent resources, they 
are not proved by drilling.  The undiscovered resources on the continental shelf amounts to 2.835 billion 
Sm3 o.e., where 51 per cent is natural gas (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2015a).   
 
The expected value of the undiscovered resources in the North Sea, Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea 
is 800, 825 and 1210 million Sm3 o.e., respectively. As figure 8 illustrates the North Sea is expected to 
hold the largest undiscovered deposits of crude oil (530 million Sm3 o.e.), while the largest deposits of 
undiscovered gas resources (740 million Sm3 o.e.) is expected to be in the Barents Sea.   
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Figure 8 - Expected value of undiscovered resources by source (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2015c) 
The uncertainty in the estimates for the North Sea range from 485 (P95) to 1315 (P05), and that of the 
Norwegian Sea from 240 to 1795 million Sm3 o.e. (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2015c). The 
uncertainty range of the aggregated resource potential for the Barents Sea is 300-3040 million Sm3 o.e. 
Compared with the two other regions on the continental shelf, estimates indicate that the Barents Sea 
holds the largest amount of total undiscovered resources.  (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2015c) 
 
 
Figure 9 - Low, expected, and high estimates of undiscovered resources (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2015a) 
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5.3.3 Exploration in The Barents Sea Going Forward 
Throughout the history of the Barents Sea as a petroleum region, the mapping and drilling of exploration 
wells have been campaign based. Such campaigns have involved an extensive focus on the region over 
short periods. The Barents Sea did especially experience a lot of attention both in the 1980s and late 
2000s. In total more than 140 exploration wells have been drilled since the opening in 1980. There are 
two types of exploration wells: wildcat and appraisal wells. The wildcats are drilled to explore the 
possibility of finding hydrocarbons deposits under the seabed in not previously explored prospects. If a 
discovery is made, appraisal wells are usually drilled to obtain more accurate data about the extent and 
size of the discovery. (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2015d). 
 
Figure 10 - Barents Sea exploration schedule (NPD factpages,2015) (Rystad Energy, 2014)  
Rystad Energy expects the drilling of exploration wells to be on a more consistent basis going forward 
(Rystad Energy, 2014). Hence, the future drilling schedules in the Barents is expected to be more 
predictable, with a higher activity level. As seen in the figure above, the exploration wave initiated in 
2011 is expected to continue for the coming five years. The oil and gas companies have communicated 
39 wells to be drilled in the period, and another 14 wells are anticipated (Rystad Energy, 2014).  
  
In the 1980s several wells showed resources of a commercial standard. Most of the discoveries, 
including Askeladd, Albatross and Snøhvit, were pooled together to form the Snøhvit-field. 
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The total deposits of recoverable resources in the region amounts to roughly 500 million Sm3. At this 
moment, only the Snøhvit-field (260 million Sm3)6 is in production, but the Goliat-field, discovered by 
ENI in 2000, is set to start production in 2015.  
 
Since 2010, several discoveries have proved to be commercially interesting. The most notable 
discoveries are Johan Castberg and Drivis discovered by Statoil in 2011 and 2014, the Gotha and Alta-
prospect discovered by Lundin in 2013 and 2014, and Wisting discovered last year by OMV. In total, nine 
discoveries were made in the Barents Sea last year in which 5 were commercially interesting (Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, 2015d). Figure 11 shows the aggregated exploration results in the Barents Sea, 
since the opening of the region in 1980. 
 
Figure 11 – Proved resources in the Barents Sea (NPD factpages, 2015) 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter explains whether the resource base and the probability of new discoveries in the Barents 
Sea is sufficient to justify the development of a new infrastructure solution in the region. We believe 
that the gas resource estimates for the region elucidate the need for a new gas infrastructure solution in 
order to facilitate further field developments. 
 
However, our point of view is that the proven resource base is not sufficient to justify building a new 
infrastructure solution. The claim is supported by calculations explained in subchapter 8.4.1, regarding 
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how the amount of discoveries relate to the transportation needs. The immaturity of the region might 
be part of the explanation for why such a large share of the resources is yet to be discovered. It is 
however possible that the timing paradox also have been contributing factor. This means that the 
limited exploration activity over the last 20 years is caused by lacking infrastructure. On the other hand, 
the planned exploration schedule indicates that O&G companies believe the region has potential, but it 
does not necessarily indicate that they are looking for natural gas. According to Oyvind Rummelhof is 
“oil driving the exploration in the Barents Sea. If we find gas we are not interested” (Rummelhoff, 
interview, 03.02.15). This indicates that the timing paradox will not be solved without intervention or a 
new approach to share the cost of a common transportation solution. Hence, we believe that it is 
appropriate to further assess whether it is profitable to build an infrastructure solution that solve the 
timing paradox.  
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In this chapter, we will discuss whether the market for natural gas will be attractive enough to justify the 
investment in a new infrastructure solution from the Barents Sea. The chapter focuses on three main 
markets, Europe, the US and Asia, with emphasis on the European market. In excess of 98 per cent of 
Norwegian natural gas export goes to Europe, and consequently Europe is the most important market 
(Enerdata, 2014). Asia has recently been the region with the most attractive natural gas prices, and can 
be reached from Norway with LNG carriers. Assessing whether this market can be attractive enough to 
justify shipping gas the additional distance, is important as infrastructure solutions vary in terms of 
delivery flexibility. The US market is relevant to assess as it determines how much, and at what cost, US 
LNG can reach global markets and is thus an important element of the competitiveness in natural gas 
markets going forward.  We discuss how gas prices have evolved across the world, and provide an 
estimate of where the prices are heading.  
6.1 Historical Development 
6.1.1 The European Market 
Since the late 1990s, the natural gas market in Europe has gradually become quite similar to a 
traditional commodity market. This has not always been the case. In its developing phase during the 
1960s and 1970s, all the natural gas was sold on legally binding long-term contracts (Rogers & Stern, 
2014). The gas was sold to one or a limited number of large buyers, who had to commit contractually to 
agreed volumes of gas. This ensured underwriting the development of upstream producing gas fields 
and the transportation infrastructure from those field locations to the markets. The price was partly 
fixed and partly linked to the price of oil products (i.e. gas oil and fuel oil). (Rogers & Stern, 2014, p.2-10) 
As there was no gas price on which to base the long-term contracts, heating oil seemed a sensible 
alternative as a competitor fuel. For the suppliers it was difficult to take advantage of regional or 
national price differences since it was hard moving the point of delivery between different receiving 
terminals. It was equally difficult for buyers to move and trade volumes on the European continent. 
Thus, oil indexing was used to provide necessary price security for both the suppliers and buyers. 
(Froley, 2015) 
 
6 The Natural Gas Markets 
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There is still a link between natural gas and oil prices, but the relationship is weaker. The reason coming 
from the emergence of gas hubs importing both LNG and pipeline gas, giving increased supply flexibility, 
and an increasingly interconnected pipeline system enabling natural gas to be transported across 
borders. As the countries in Western Europe and Great Britain have the flexibility to trade and physically 
move natural gas across regions, the price differences between the different hubs in Europe have 
diminished and the natural gas prices have declined.   
 
While Europe as a whole has continuously been moving away from oil-indexation, accounting for 43  per 
cent of total gas consumption in 2013, the move towards gas-on-gas competition has not been 
universal. In Central Europe, the Mediterranean region and South-Eastern Europe oil-indexation is still 
dominating. (The Market Observatory for Energy European Commission, 2014) The oil-indexed contracts 
often allow a flexible offtake, meaning that the buyers can adjust their offtake between 80-120 per cent 
of an agreed amount (Rogers & Stern, 2014, p.2). This means that when oil prices fall, and the oil 
indexed contracts become cheaper than the hub prices, it causes a 120 per cent off-take as the buyers 
see an arbitrage opportunity by selling oil indexed gas at the hubs. In the end, this arbitrage closes, 
meaning that the hub prices also decline. Often the oil-indexed contracts are based on the average oil 
price the last 6-18 months, meaning that the gas price to some extent follows the oil price with a time 
lag.  
6.1.2 The Asian Market 
Since Japan started importing LNG in the end of the 1960s, Asian countries have been highly dependent 
on LNG supplies (Enerdata, 2014). China is an exception as the country has domestic production and has 
been importing pipeline gas from Central-Asia and Myanmar. When the Asian LNG import wave started, 
the price was fixed, causing few problems until the substantial increase in oil prices in 1973, putting LNG 
at a discount to oil (International Energy Agency, 2014b). In the 1970s, LNG and oil were competitive 
energy sources for power generation. Consequently, the LNG suppliers gradually introduced long-term 
contracts where the price of LNG was indexed to crude oil prices. Today, most Asian natural gas 
contracts are linked to the Japan Custom-cleared Crude index (JCC). The JCC is the weighted average 
price of Japanese oil imports. Figure 12 illustrates the importance of the Asian markets for global LNG 
demand.  
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Figure 12 - LNG Imports 2014 by country – total 246 million tons per annum (Wood MacKenzie, 2015) 
Since the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan has relied on energy generation from non-nuclear sources. 
This has led to soaring prices of LNG, as the bargaining power of Japanese utilities was week due to the 
urgent need for additional natural gas volumes, in an already supply constrained market (International 
Gas Union, 2014, p.15). In July 2012, LNG spot prices reached a historic high of $18.07/Mbtu. However, 
the prices have declined since the oil prices started to drop in the second half of 2014. The price the last 
day of February 2015 was down to $13.39/Mbtu. This price is the Japan LNG Corporation’s index, which 
is based on monthly surveys of what natural gas importers paid for their acquired volumes. Other 
indices indicate an even more severe drop in prices. The Platts JKM Index, which is a benchmark for spot 
LNG delivered to Korea and Japan, indicated a year-on-year drop in prices of more than 60 per cent from 
March 2014 to March 2015. In March 2014 the JKM prices reached an historic high of 20.20/Mbtu. By 
comparison, March-delivery JKM prices in 2015 averaged $7.44/Mbtu, the lowest since June 2010. (PR 
Newswire, 2015) 
6.1.3 The US Market 
In the US, there has been an independent market for natural gas since the 1920s when natural gas was 
discovered in the American southeast. Initially, long-term contracts were the norm, and prices differed 
across the country. This started to change in the late 1970s, when price controls gradually started to be 
removed and the spot market started to evolve. (Moniz et. Al, 2012) Since then, the price has been 
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highly correlated with the price of crude oil until the mid-2000s. Historically natural gas in the US has 
been priced at a thermal parity discount of around 40 per cent compared to oil, meaning that if oil prices 
where USD100 you would pay USD60 for the same amount of energy in the form of natural gas (Erdôs & 
Ormos, 2012). However, when the shale gas revolution started this relationship changed as the natural 
gas prices fell drastically while the oil prices soared. Before the oil prices started to decline in July 2014, 
the natural gas was priced at a thermal discount of 77 per cent to oil. This means that while oil was 
trading at around $100 per barrel for West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the price of the equivalent 
amount of energy in natural gas was around $23 per barrel of oil equivalent.7  
6.1.4 Shared Characteristics 
Looking at the historical development in the key natural gas trading regions, two shared characteristics 
are the increasing importance of gas-on-gas competition and the emergence of spot markets. 44 per 
cent of the world pipeline imports, and 29 per cent of LNG, has prices determined by gas-on-gas 
competition. The share of LNG traded on short-term contracts (less than 4 years) has been growing 
steadily from approximately 5 per cent in 2000 to around 65 per cent in 2013. (International Energy 
Agency, 2014b, p.20-22) The change form long to short-term contracts intensify the competition in the 
LNG market, and is a shift towards market driven pricing.  
 
The figure below shows the historical spot prices at key trading areas. The NBP, TTF and Zeebrugge are 
three main trading hubs in Europe, located in Great Britain, The Netherlands and Belgium, respectively. 
As a result of a more spot driven market, these hubs have become much more liquid in the past decade 
(Medbøen, interview, 04.02.15) 
 
                                                          
7 $ 𝑀𝑏𝑡𝑢⁄ ∗ 5.8 = $/𝐵𝑂𝐸 
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Figure 13 - Development of natural gas spot prices (Bloomberg Terminal, 2015) 
6.2 The Changing Demand for Natural Gas 
According to the IEA World Energy Outlook 2014, natural gas will be the fastest growing fossil energy 
source towards 2040. The global consumption is estimated to grow by more than 50 per cent over the 
course of the next 35 years. (International Energy Agency, 2014a) 
6.2.1 The European Market 
Europe's consumption is expected to stay below 2010-level until 2030. However, imports are expected 
to increase as the domestic production in the EU is expected to decline. (International Energy Agency, 
2014a). One reason for the slow growth in natural gas consumption is the reemergence of coal in the 
energy mix. The shale gas revolution in the US has led to an increasing share of surplus coal being 
shipped over the Atlantic from the US to Europe. Being the most carbon intensive energy source, the 
growth of global coal consumption needs to slow down for Europe to reach the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change’s 2-degree target (International Energy Agency, 2014a). Another factor is the growing 
share of electricity generated by renewable energy sources. Figure 14 illustrates the total electricity 
generation in terawatt hours (TWh) for natural gas in Europe from 1990-2012.   
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Figure 14 - Electricity generation from natural gas in the EU (The World Bank, 2014) 
Coal and renewables have taken market shares from natural gas in electricity generation. Globally, 
electricity is expected to be the fastest growing final form of energy towards 2040, with an expected 
annual growth in demand of 2.1 per cent. However, in Europe, the annual growth rate over the next 35 
years is expected to be only 0.7 per cent p.a. Slow economic -and population growth are the main 
reasons why Europe's electricity demand will grow at a slower pace compared to the rest of the world. 
Measures to improve energy efficiency are also part of the explanation. (International Energy Agency, 
2014a) 
 
Still, looking at electricity consumption does not offer the full explanation for the expected development 
in Europe’s natural gas demand. Figure 14 depicts that Europe’s trend in electricity generation is less 
important as is accounts for a small share of the total natural gas consumption on the continent. 
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Figure 15 - EU28 Natural gas sales by sector (Eurogas, 2014) 
As seen in figure 15, in excess of three fourths of the total consumption goes to other applications than 
power generation. Fuel switching in these sectors takes more time, and is actually expected to 
contribute to increased use of natural gas going forward (International Energy Agency, 2014a). The 
residential and commercial share of the consumption refers to natural gas used directly for heating 
homes, commercial buildings, and for cooking food. This demand varies with weather conditions, but is 
stable in terms of maintaining market share. The potential efficiency gains for this part of the 
consumption are also limited (International Energy Agency, 2014a). The share of industry using natural 
gas directly as feedstock is expected to increase due to fuel switching, but this increase in demand is 
expected to be partly offset by efficiency gains.     
 
The cooling relationship between the EU and its main supplier of natural gas, Russia, has created 
political ambitions to reduce Europe's dependence on Russia’s main gas exporter, Gazprom. In the 
1980s, the United States were actively lobbying for Western Europe to reduce its dependence on Soviet 
gas, and the US took an active position in promoting gas deliveries from Norway. In 1986, when the deal 
between Norwegian authorities, Ruhrgas, and Gas de France was reached regarding developing the 
natural gas resources from the Troll field. The price was according to analysts twice as high as current 
levels (Tagliabue, 1986).  
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Whether it is possible to find buyers in Europe, still willing to pay this kind of premium is doubtful. Still, 
there is a preference for Norwegian gas compared to Russian gas and we believe this will continue to be 
the case in the future. 
6.2.2 The Asian Market 
As previously discussed, the price of natural gas in Japan skyrocketed in 2011 because of the Fukushima 
nuclear accident. The accident caused the country to shut down all its nuclear power plants. As Japan 
has no domestic gas production or pipeline connection, the accident created an additional demand for 
LNG. The total consumption grew by 22 per cent between 2010 and 2012, but has since leveled off due 
to energy conservation measures triggered by high LNG import prices and the fact that gas fired power 
plants already were operating at high load factors (International Energy Agency, 2014a). In April 2014, 
Japan introduced a new strategic energy plan, which outlines a systematic reintroduction of nuclear 
power to the domestic energy mix. As a result, the natural gas consumption is expected to be back at 
pre-Fukushima levels in 2020 (International Energy Agency, 2014a). As Japan is by far the world's largest 
importer of LNG, the drop in LNG prices, has significantly pulled into question the profitability of the 
planned LNG export projects around the world (Meyer, McLannahan, & Hume, 2014)  
 
China and India are expected to see the largest growth in natural gas demand between 2012 and 2040.  
These two countries combined stood for less than 6 per cent of global gas consumption in 2012, but this 
figure is expected to increase to almost 10 per cent in 2020 and 15 per cent in 2040 (International 
Energy Agency, 2014a). In China, gas will play an important role in mitigating coal use and related air 
pollution in cities. Thus, the Chinese government has introduced price reform initiatives, to bring 
domestic prices to levels that incentivize the development of domestic resources as well as covering the 
average costs of imported gas. Unlike many other Asian countries, China produces most of the gas it 
consumes domestically (72 per cent in 2012). The domestic production in China is expected to account 
for more the half the volumes consumed, somewhat limiting the need for imports. (International Energy 
Agency, 2014a)         
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Figure 16 - Natural gas consumption in key Asian markets (Enerdata, 2014) (International Energy Agency, 2014a) 
6.2.3 The US Market 
The US accounts for in excess of 20 per cent of global natural gas consumption, and demand is expected 
to increase at an average annual growth rate of 0,7 per cent towards 2040. Ample supply and new 
policies that favor gas utilization over other fossil fuels in power generation and end-use sectors, are the 
reasons why natural gas consumption will increase and capture market shares from coal. Before the 
shale gas revolution, the US where set to be a net importer of natural gas, with supplies coming from 
Canada and from LNG (among others from Snøhvit LNG in Norway). Now the US is set to become a net 
exporter. However, how much gas that will be exported depends on the domestic US gas prices, and if 
the price difference compared to other regions will justify LNG exports.       
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Figure 17 - Coal and natural consumption in the US (International Energy Agency, 2014a)    
6.3 Price Expectations     
Predicting future prices is a challenging exercise and unforeseen events can suddenly change dynamics 
of supply and demand drastically. The US shale revolution and the Japanese Fukushima disaster 
epitomize this.  
 
We believe that gas prices going forward will be determined by supply and demand, meaning the oil-
linked contracts will continue to be phased out. In the long run natural gas competes with all alternative 
energy sources like hydropower, wind, solar and coal. Oil is different since its high energy density gives a 
unique advantage for the transportation sector. The price of natural gas will thus in the end need to be 
competitive compared to other sources of energy. 
 
“I do not think you ever will see the link between oil and gas back the way it used to be. The prices will be 
delinked. Oil and gas covers two completely different needs in the market” (Pettersen, interview, 
04.02.2015)  
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6.3.1 The European Market 
For power generation in Europe, natural gas is cheaper than renewables, but more expensive than coal. 
However, it is important to note that political ambitions to reduce carbon emissions, and in some 
countries phase out nuclear, will have an impact on the competitiveness of different energy sources. In 
Germany for example, the political program “Energiwende” set ambitious targets to increase the share 
of renewables in the energy mix, reduce carbon emissions, and at the same time phase out nuclear 
energy. The EU has set a target to reduce the overall greenhouse gas emissions from its member states 
by 20 per cent compared 1990 levels, by 2020. (European Commission, 2014) To reach this target, 
carbon emission taxation will have to be increased, providing a comparative advantage for natural gas 
compared to coal. We argue that increased carbon taxation will increase both the price of electricity and 
the price of natural gas. We therefore expect natural gas prices to increase slightly from current levels, 
as the low cost competitor, coal, will compete with a tax disadvantage.  
 
The current price of gas in Western Europe is $7/Mbtu. US LNG exporters need a price of about 
$8/Mbtu to break even with current Henry Hub prices ($2.78/Mbtu) (EY, 2012). This will to some extent 
put a price ceiling for gas in Europe, as pipeline exporters will have to match the price of LNG to 
maintain their market share. The cost of bringing new supplies to Europe is believed to be about $7.50-
$9.50/Mbtu. In the long-run prices will have to match the cost of bringing in new supplies.          
 
“At some point in time, the price will reach an equilibrium were the producers break even. This will 
probably happen in Europe, but it will slightly depend on what Russia and Qatar will do if they try to 
undercut, as they can deliver cheap pipeline gas and LNG. If you look at what it cost to bring in new 
supply, either from Siberia, Haltenbanken or elsewhere, it will probably be around $7.5-9.5/Mbtu.” 
(Rummelhoff, interview, 03.02.15) 
 
Our estimate of the natural gas prices in Europe going forward is $8/Mbtu. We believe that this is a 
conservative estimate, making it appropriate to use in further assessments of the infrastructure 
solutions.  
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6.3.2 The Asian Market 
We argue that as the Asian spot markets continue to evolve, the premium Asia has been paying for LNG 
is likely to diminish. This argument is further supported by the China-Russia pipeline gas deal signed on 
May 21 2014. The agreed volume at 38 BCM/year represents almost 1.5 times the current Chinese LNG 
imports. The price at the Chinese border has not been officially disclosed, but consensus lies at 
$10/Mbtu (International Energy Agency, 2014b). Since Russian pipeline gas enters the Asian markets at 
prices significantly below LNG imports there may be the start of the convergence in prices between Asia 
and Europe. Russia will soon have the ability to move supplies from Siberia to both Europe and Asia, 
paving the way for a more integrated Eurasian market.    
 
Up until now, most LNG projects have been structured in the same way as a point-to-point pipeline 
project, linking the resources to a defined set of buyers. Over time, the international LNG trade is set to 
open up, gaining characteristics similar to a standard commodity market. An important driver of this 
change is that a small but growing share of international trade is taken by LNG marketers, known as 
aggregators, that sell gas from a global portfolio and look for arbitrage opportunities between various 
regional import prices. (International Energy Agency, 2014a)  
 
Shale gas production in China is also a major uncertainty for future LNG needs (International Energy 
Agency, 2014b). China is currently the largest shale gas producer outside North America, and the 
government has set aggressive targets for increasing its production. The wellhead prices of Chinese 
shale are currently around $10/Mbtu. (International Energy Agency, 2014b)  
 
In Asia, LNG import prices differ widely from delivery to delivery, depending on what type of contract 
the gas is bought on. In 2012, China imported some LNG from Australia and Kazakhstan based on old 
long-term contracts to a price of $3/Mbtu, and some spot LNG from Qatar to $18/Mbtu. (International 
Energy Agency, 2014b)  
 
- “Large LNG liquefaction projects in Australia are soon coming on stream. Then you have Qatar 
with stable deliveries to the Asian markets. So I don’t think the large price differences in LNG is 
sustainable” (Moræus Hansen, interview, 04.02.2015) 
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- “The imbalance (in gas prices between continents) cannot last forever. It is enormous 
investments being made to close this gap” (Omre, interview, 05.02.2015)      
 
We estimate that the natural gas prices in Asia will decline, reaching an average of $10/Mbtu. Prices 
might differ slightly between countries that have domestic production and access to pipeline supplies, 
and counties that is fully dependent on LNG, like Japan and South Korea. However, the difference will be 
limited as an arbitrage from moving LNG from mainland Asia to these countries will be closed, due to 
LNG traders seeking a profit from regional price differences. A final argument supporting a price 
estimate of $10/Mbtu, is that US LNG export deliveries to Asia break even at this price (International 
Energy Agency, 2014b)  
Estimating the field development costs for natural gas resources is difficult as each field is unique and 
requires different technical solutions (Omre, interview, 05.02.15). However, estimating a range of the 
likely break-even costs is important to complete the analysis regarding whether it is profitable to 
develop the Barents Sea resources.  
 
In the table below, we have compared the Snøhvit LNG development in the Barents Sea with the Ormen 
Lange and the Aasta Hansteen natural gas developments in the Norwegian Sea. Ormen Lange and Aasta 
Hansteen utilize pipeline infrastructure. 
 
 
 
The field development cost for Snøhvit and Ormen Lange accounts for approximately one third of the 
total project development costs. This is in line with estimates for developments in the Barents Sea, 
which are that one third of the necessary investments will be related to infrastructure (Gassco, 2014). 
Aasta Hansteen is an exception, as the infrastructure accounts for more than half of the total 
7 Field Development Cost 
  
Recoverable 
Reserves 
(BCM) 
 Field 
development 
(MNOK) 
Total 
cost 
(MNOK) 
 Field development 
cost/Recoverable Reserves 
(NOK/ Cubic Meters) 
  Infrastructure 
(MNOK) 
Production 
(BCM/year)   
Snohvit LNG 218.7 39,300 19,000 58,300 5.8 0.087 
Ormen Lange 283.7 46,800 19,200 66,000 25.0 0.068 
Aasta Hansteen 46.5 24,100 30,100 54,200 5.2 0.647 
Table 2 - Field development cost compared to recoverable reserves (Detailed list of sources in the appendix) 
44 
 
investments. However, this infrastructure is planned to cover several fields in the area, which are to be 
developed later.  
 
The single most important factor for determining the field investment cost per unit of gas is the size of 
the recoverable reserves in the field (Torvund, interview, 04.04.2015). As can be seen in table 2, Ormen 
Lange and Snøhvit with its considerable larger reserves, have a field development cost to recoverable 
reserves which is about 1/10 of that of Aasta Hansteen. This lower field development cost make these 
developments much more robust towards the fluctuations in the natural gas market than the Aasta 
Hansteen field (Torvund, interview, 04.04.2015). 
 
There is a natural link between the size of the reserves and the annual production. The annual 
production will gradually be reduced over time due to the declining pressure in the reservoir. A high 
annual production volume in the beginning of a field’s life will improve the economics of a field 
development. However, this will have to be optimized accounting for the additional investment required 
to increase the capacity at both the field level and in the infrastructure. As a rule of thumb, the majority 
of the total reserves should be produced over a period of 10-15 years (Torvund, interview, 04.04.2015). 
 
Figure 18 illustrates the difference in the capital cost measured in USD per Mbtu for Snøhvit, Ormen 
Lange and Aasta Hansteen. The discount factor has been set to 8 per cent, and the regularity is set to 
100 per cent for simplicity. 
 
Figure 18 - Capital cost of selected natural gas developments on NCS (detailed list of assumptions in appendix) 
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In addition to the initial field development costs, the projects require that new production wells are 
drilled during the course of the projects lifetime to maintain production. The number of new wells that 
have to be drilled depends on the characteristics of the reservoirs (Torvund, interview, 04.04.2015). 
These investments have not been included in the calculations.  
 
Field development cost is dependent on field specific characteristics such as distance to shore, sea level, 
reservoir characteristics, development concepts, and environmental requirements. Even ultra large 
fields can end up undeveloped, due to the particularly challenging nature of the Barents Sea region, and 
distance from existing infrastructure. The Shtokman gas field, located on the Russian side of the Barents 
Sea, is the largest discovered offshore gas field ever. Found in 1988, it is expected to hold approximately 
3800 BCM of recoverable gas, almost 3 times as much as the Troll field. The location of Shtokman, 600 
km from shore in the harsh Arctic environment, has caused it to be left undeveloped. Statoil who was 
selected to be a partner in the project wrote down its investment in 2012 and returned its shares to 
Gazprom.  
 
Shtokman might be a particularly challenging project, and the fact that it lies in Russian waters might be 
a contributing factor for why it still is undeveloped. Still, challenges concerning distance to shore and 
weather conditions are also present on the Norwegian side of the Barents Sea, and these can have a 
significant impact on the cost of field developments.  
 
Many factors influence the profitability of the natural gas deposits in the Barents Sea. The most 
important will be the size of total reserves per field. “The main challenge for an infrastructure 
development in the Barents Sea is the lack of a major gas field, which could be developed at competitive 
unit cost and thereby be the building block for a pipeline connection to the Norwegian Sea” (Torvund, 
interview, 04.04.2015) 
 
It is difficult to apply a benchmark for the development cost as each prospect has field specific 
characteristics. However, as the Aasta Hansteen field is similar in size to several proven fields in the 
Barents Sea, like Norvarg, we choose to use this field as a proxy for the development costs. Thus, our 
estimate of field development cost for further analysis is $3.9/Mbtu. If larger fields are proven in the 
future, the development costs are likely to be lower.     
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So far, we have concluded that the resource potential, the market price, and the cost of field 
development can justify further assessments of whether the resources can be profitably developed. In 
this chapter we evaluate different infrastructure alternatives, which allows for determining the costs 
that the natural gas can be transported to the markets.  
8.1 Possible Transportation Solutions 
There are three main options for capitalizing on the natural gas resources in the Barents Sea. One 
alternative is to use the natural gas locally, either by converting it to electricity and sell it on the grid, or 
use it directly as feedstock in local industry. Converting it to electricity will require investments in new 
high-voltage cables to increase the transfer capacity between Northern and Southern Norway, as well as 
the transfer capacity between Norway and Europe. This option is challenging since transporting 
electricity over large distances leads to quite large power losses.  
 
Using natural gas directly for industrial applications involves building up a new demand. The 
petrochemical industry, production of fertilizers, metals, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and tiers are 
examples of industries that use natural gas directly as feedstock. Several gas rich nations have focused 
on developing a local demand for their resources, like Qatar where Norsk Hydro produce aluminum as a 
result of low energy prices. Taking into account that the gas in the Barents Sea requires large 
investments in upstream installations we argue that it will not be economically viable to sell locally. This 
conclusion is drawn primarily from the prices the fields have to match, which is at least those in the US 
of about $3/Mbtu, if not those in the Middle East. For energy intense industries to stay competitive, 
they need competitive prices on their most important inputs (Torvund, interview, 04.04.2015).  
 
The other two options involve exporting the natural gas directly. This can be done either by pipeline or 
by ship. There are three main ways to transport natural gas by ship; cooled, compressed, or converted 
to liquid fuels. In industry terms, the options are liquefied natural gas (LNG), compressed natural gas 
(CNG) or gas to liquids (GTL).  
8 Infrastructure 
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8.1.1 Pipeline 
The vast majority of Norwegian natural gas is exported via pipeline, which accounts for more than 93 
per cent of total export volumes. In 2013, close to 90 per cent of Europe's gas imports came via pipeline, 
while the remaining share came in the form of LNG. Europe consumes 500 BCM of natural gas (2013), 
and imports in excess of 50 BCM of LNG. The remaining 450 BCM is transported via the pipeline system 
from sources located close and far from the market, especially from Europe, North Africa and Russia.  
(BP, 2014) 
 
Figure 19- Breakdown of EU-28 natural gas supplies (Eurogas, 2014) 
The key advantage of a gas pipeline is the volume flexibility. Since building overcapacity is relatively 
cheap, a pipeline can be scaled to take large additional volumes with little new investments involved. 
Pipelines have been the preferred choice for transportation of natural gas for a long time, especially for 
large volumes. The world’s largest pipeline, the Nord Stream subsea pipeline, provides a direct link 
between Russia and Germany and transport 55 BCM per annum.  The Troll gas field on NCS is also a 
major contributor to the German pipeline system, and the field alone produced 29 BCM in 2014 
(Gassmagasinet G21, 2015). Capex in pipeline projects vary on a wide range of factors, including 
whether it is onshore or offshore, the capacity, the length, and the geological conditions of the 
terrain/seabed.   
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We argue that USD/BCM/meter is a good “bang-for-the-buck” indication when comparing pipeline 
projects as it accounts for both capacity and length. Table 3 shows the cost and capacity numbers for 
various pipeline projects around the world. We see that Barentspipe rank in the middle on the cost-
capacity comparison, given the cost estimates provided by the Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure-forum. 
(Gassco, 2014)   
 
Cost capacity 
rank 
 
Project 
Length 
(km) 
Capacity 
(BCM) 
Diameter 
(Inch) 
Capex 
(MUSD) 
 
USD/BCM/meter 
1 Langeled 1,166 26 44 2,720 91.5 
2 Europipe 2 642 24 42 1,690 109.7 
3 Franpipe 840 19 42 1,866 116.9 
4 North Stream 1,222 55 4x48 11,264 167.6 
5 South Stream 925 63 4x32 12,800 219.6 
6 Barentspipe 1,000 45 42 10,000 222.2 
7 Blue Stream 396 16 2x24 1,700 268.3 
8 ITGI 217 10 32 640 294.9 
9 Europipe 1 670 18 40 3,750 310.9 
10 Medgaz 210 8 24 806 479.8 
 
Table 3 – Cost and capacity comparison of various pipeline projects (detailed list of sources in the appendix) 
8.1.2 Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
Liquefied natural gas, or LNG, is natural gas cooled to minus 162 degrees Celsius, where it turns into a 
liquid. In this state, the gas takes up about 1/600 of the volume of its gaseous state, which makes it 
possible to transport significant volumes by ship. (Jensen, 2004, p.5)  
 
LNG achieves a higher reduction in volume than compressed natural gas (CNG), which is about 2.4 times 
less energy dense. However, LNG is still less energy dense and it has a lower value per unit of energy 
compared to crude oil. The result is that the value of the cargo of two similar sized vessels, an oil tanker 
and a LNG carrier, is quite different at current prices. This means that shipping is a much more 
important cost component in the LNG value chain compared to crude oil. Table 4 illustrates the 
difference in newbuilding price between oil tankers and LNG carriers and the difference in value of the 
cargo.  
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Type 
Newbuilding 
price (Mill.$) 
 
Capacity 
Energy carried 
(Mbtu) 
 
Price ($) 
Value of 
cargo ($) 
DHT Lion VLCC 96.5 2.2 million barrels 12,122,000 65/bbl 143,000,000 
Front Idun Suezmax 65 1.1 million barrels 6,061,000 65/bbl 71,500,000 
Golar Snow LNG Carrier 200 160k cubic meters 3,776,000 10/Mbtu 37,760,000 
 
Table 4 - Comparison of crude oil tankers and LNG carriers (all vessels delivered in 2015) (Clarksons, 2015) 
The LNG market has been growing since the new millennium, partly because of new technology 
improving the profitability, and partly because of large regional price differences. Prior to 2000, LNG was 
mainly confined to markets lacking alternative supply options, therefore excluding sale to regions that 
had access to pipeline gas. However, new gas producing regions such as Trinidad and Tobago and Qatar 
entered the market, and these entrants were able to deliver at cost levels that challenged energy prices 
even in developed markets. (Songhurst, 2014, p.4) 
 
LNG liquefaction capacity is measured in million tons per annum (mtpa). In 2014, 246 mtpa were 
produced in the world, which equals approximately 340 BCM. Another 30 mtpa is scheduled to be added 
in 2015 (Wood MacKenzie, 2015)   
 
The capital cost of liquefaction has quadrupled since year 2000. Capital cost of liquefaction is measured 
in $/ton per annum (tpa), meaning the project’s capex divided by annual output of LNG. This provides a 
measure of capex ($) to capacity (tpa). Norway's only LNG liquefaction plant, Snøhvit LNG, had a record 
capex/capacity8 ratio when it was completed in 2007 (Songhurst, 2014, p.23). Figure 20 illustrates the 
steep increase in capital costs the last 15 years.  
                                                          
8 Measured at $/tpa 
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Figure 20 - Capital cost of liquefaction for various LNG projects (Songhurst, 2014)  
8.1.3 Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) 
Compressed natural gas is gas turned into liquid form by applying high pressure. As CNG occupies more 
than twice the volume compared to LNG, more vessels are needed to transport the same amount of 
natural gas. The advantage of CNG is that the compression and decompression facilities are less 
expensive than liquefaction and regasification plants. This implies lower capex and higher operational 
expenditures (opex) than LNG. (Coselle, 2015)  
 
CNG carriers utilize a new and unproven technology, which is not yet tested on a commercial scale. The 
first commercial CNG vessel is scheduled for delivery in May 2016 to the Indonesian state-owned energy 
company Perusahaan Listrik Negara (Wainwright, 2014). CNG is considered a viable transportation 
option for markets that are 1000 km or less from the source of the natural gas. As the distance from the 
market increases, LNG or gas to liquids (GTL) become more favorable, assuming that sufficient volumes 
of gas are available. The threshold volumes required for CNG are expected to be relatively small 
compared to LNG and GTL. (McIntosh et al., 2001)  
 
CNG could be a viable alternative for transporting associated gas from oilfields in the Barents Sea. 
However, as the distance to the closest market is in excess of 2000 km, current CNG technology will not 
provide an economical solution for pure gas developments.  
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8.1.4 Gas to Liquids (GTL) 
Turning natural gas into liquid fuel (GTL) has been done on a small scale since the 1920s. Large-scale GTL 
plants are relatively new. Qatar has the only operating commercial large scale plant, and there is 
another being planned in Louisiana. These plants convert natural gas into diesel fuel by applying a 
technique called Fischer Tropsch technology. In areas of the world with large price differences between 
natural gas and oil, this technology could offer an attractive opportunity. In Qatar for example, the 
domestic price of gas is $1/Mbtu, which means that even with low oil prices converting gas to diesel 
could make sense. Global GTL production is about 215,000 bpd, but the output is projected to increase 
to 360,000 bpd in 2025 and 1,000,000 bpd in 2040 (International Energy Agency, 2014a).  
 
GTL plants exist in areas where there is a large price difference between oil and gas, meaning that gas 
sells at a significant discount in terms of thermal parity. Due to high capex associated with GTL projects, 
it is difficult to make GTL profitable with oil prices below $80/bbl. Even with optimistic capex estimates 
of $100,000/bpd, natural gas needs to be valued at a discount in excess of 70 per cent compared to oil 
to be profitable (Salehi, Nel & Save, 2013). This means that for GTL to be profitable with current oil 
prices at $65/bbl, the feed gas must have a price below $3.25/Mbtu for the plant to deliver an internal 
rate of return around 10 per cent. The development of the plant in Louisiana has been postponed due to 
low oil prices, which could be a sign that the price spread needs to be even larger to turn a profit 
(McGroarty & Sider, 2015). On the other hand, the decision to postpone the plant was made in late 
January 2015, when WTI traded below $50 and Henry Hub at $2.9/Mbtu. A 70 per cent thermal discount 
of $50 oil would give a gas price of $2.5/Mbtu, meaning that the spread was below 70 per cent at the 
time.  
 
For associated gas, where the alternative is reinjecting the gas to the reservoirs, the feedstock price for 
GTL is close to zero. This means that, under the assumption that bringing the gas to shore is relatively 
cheap; GTL could be a viable alternative in the Barents Sea. Small sized GTL plants for associated gas are 
relatively small and simple, and can thus be placed offshore on the production platform. (Kelly-Detwiler, 
2013) 
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8.2 Choosing the Right Infrastructure 
8.2.1 General Assessments 
A general rule of thumb goes that if the gas needs to be transported more than 2,500 kilometers, LNG is 
the best solution (White, 2012). For shorter distances pipeline is more economical. In the oil and gas 
business, each project is different, and it is therefore important to be careful when relying on historical 
data for making investment decisions. In the Barents Sea, the distance to the European markets is 
approximately 3,000 kilometers; however, 2/3 of the distance is already covered by the existing pipeline 
system, which will have free capacity to take on additional volumes from the next decade and onwards 
(Aarhus & Nestass, interview, 06.02.15). When comparing pipeline and LNG, it is also important to 
address which markets the solutions enable the gas to reach. The potential benefit that LNG can provide 
in terms of delivery flexibility will be discussed later in this segment.  
 
GTL and CNG on a commercial scale are both new and unproven technologies. It is therefore difficult to 
say under which circumstances these technologies are advantageous. The first ever CNG vessel is 
currently under construction for the purpose of transporting natural gas to remote islands in Indonesia 
(Wainwright, 2014). Fields that have a short distance by sea and a water depth that makes subsea 
pipelines challenging, is possibly where the advantages of this technology comes clear. For GTL, low oil 
prices have reduced the attractiveness of the technology in areas were the gas alternatively can reach 
the market in its original form. GTL emits very high levels of CO2 compared to the other alternatives, 
which will reduce its economic potential in countries like Norway where CO2 emissions are taxed. We 
argue that the future for GTL could be for associated gas in remote areas on shore, where the oil is 
transported from the production sites by railway, or where gas transport is challenging for other 
reasons.        
 
The table below presents the characteristics of the different transportation solutions. Pipeline and CNG 
are similar in that flexibility regarding the point of delivery is limited. GTL and LNG on the other hand, 
make it possible to achieve the highest prices in the market. Further, LNG and pipeline are similar in that 
both technologies are well proven on a commercial scale, while GTL and CNG, with the capacity needed 
for exploiting pure gas developments in the Barents Sea, exist on a very limited scale.  
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Capex estimator 
Capacity (16 
BCM/year) 
Capex 
(MNOK) Price of output  
Value of output 
per day (NOK)   
Pipeline $222/BCM/m 45 MSm3/day 75,000 $8/Mbtu 95,350,500 
LNG $2000/mtpa  12 mtpa 180,000 $10/Mbtu 119,188,125 
GTL $135,714/bpd  140 000 bpd 142,500 $65/bbl 68,250,000 
CNG N/A N/A N/A $8/Mbtu 95,350,500 
 
Table 5 - Comparison of technologies, equal capacity (16 BCM/annum)  
The capex estimates in table 5 are based on similar projects in the case of LNG and GTL. The GTL cost 
estimate is based on information about the Shell Pearl GTL in Qatar, which is the only existing GTL plant 
of this scale. The LNG estimate is based on capex from Snøhvit LNG, and then scaled to size. As discussed 
has the cost of LNG liquefaction quadrupled since 2000 (Songhurst, 2014). The cost may decrease 
through learning curves, but there is no evidence of this happening. The economies of scale for LNG 
liquefaction has historically been limited for plants with capacity over 5 mtpa, meaning that a plant with 
10 mtpa costs about twice as much as a plant with a capacity of 5 mtpa. The pipeline capex is based on 
the Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure research report from Gassco (Gassco, 2014). 
 
It is important to note that the value of output per day does not include natural gas liquids (NGL). In the 
case of Pear GTL for example, the facility produces 120,000 barrels per day of NGL in addition to the 
GTL. As NGL is priced quite equal to oil per barrel, this significantly changes the project economics. The 
NGL will however be produced regardless of infrastructure solution chosen, and can therefore be left 
out when comparing the alternatives.  
 
In conclusion, we believe that pipeline and LNG are the most attractive alternatives for pure natural gas 
developments in the Barents Sea. These technologies are well proven and suit the characteristics of the 
region. We will therefore focus the rest of this segment on these alternatives.  
8.2.2 Pipeline Capacity Flexibility 
For a pipeline, the cost/capacity relationship is far from linear. This means that when there is potential 
of linking an uncertain amount of resources to a market with excess demand, building overcapacity 
often makes sense. The Barents Sea is an immature and relatively unexplored petroleum province, with 
a good chance of finding large volumes of natural gas. As mentioned earlier, the Troll gas field produced 
29 BCM in 2014, close to 80 MSm3/day. The 42-inch pipeline that the industry suggests as a possible 
solution for the Barents Sea has an initial capacity of 45 Msm3/day (Gassco, 2014). However, a relatively 
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modest investment of MNOK 6,000 in increased compression can increase the capacity to 72 MSm3/day. 
In comparison, increasing LNG export capacity by the same amount would cost close to MNOK 110,000, 
based on the $2,000/tpa benchmark estimate.  
 
  Original capacity Additional capacity Measures needed Cost (MNOK) 
Pipeline 45 Msm3/day 27 Msm3/day Increased compression 6,000 
LNG 12 mtpa 7.3 mtpa 1 large LNG train 109,500 
 
Table 6 - Additional capex needed to increase capacity 
8.2.3 LNG Flexibility Value 
The number of LNG receiving terminals around the world has increased drastically since 2008. By the 
end of 2013, 29 countries had LNG import capacity, compared to 18 countries in 2008. The global 
receiving capacity (regasification capacity) was 688 mtpa, compared to the 291 mtpa liquefaction 
capacity (IGU, 2014). The difference in import and export capacity is expected to become smaller as US 
and Australian projects come on stream, but the market is still expected to be supply constrained in the 
years to come. This means that LNG exporters have had the opportunity to direct their supplies to the 
most attractive markets. (IGU, 2014) 
 
Modern LNG vessels can transport gas over long distances with very little loss of energy (boil off) 
(Hammer, interview, 19.05.2015). This has given LNG exporters the opportunity to direct their supplies 
to wherever they can get the highest prices, without being constrained by distances. LNG from the US 
east coast is intended to supply the Asian markets, and shipments of LNG from Snøhvit has found its 
way from the Barents Sea to Japan through the Suez-canal. 
 
The access to global markets is a clear benefit for LNG exporters. However, some LNG import terminals 
might be intended rather as a bargaining chip than an actual supply source of gas. In Lithuania for 
example, the pipeline system is more than capable of supplying the demand, but an LNG receiving 
terminal has still been built to diversify the source of supply. In 2013, the average utilization rate of 
European LNG receiving terminals was 26 per cent (IGU, 2014). However, the utilization rate of the 120 
mtpa of US regasification capacity was 1.4 per cent the same year. These terminals were built before the 
shale gas revolution, when importing LNG in to the US was believed to be an attractive opportunity.    
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8.2.4 Optimal Scale 
The optimal capacity of infrastructure will be different depending on the solution. The cost/capacity 
relationship for an LNG facility gives an incentive to scale the facility to match the discovered 
commercial recourses, while the economies of scale in a pipeline project gives incentives to build 
overcapacity to retain the potential upside. The LNG solution suggested by the industry is one LNG train 
of 5 mtpa, while the pipeline discussed has a capacity of 45 MSm3/day (Gassco, 2014). 
 
 Capex 
estimator Optimal scale Capex (MNOK) 
Price of output 
($/Mbtu) 
Value of output 
per day (MNOK)   
Pipeline $222/BCM/m 45 MSm3/day 75,000 8 95 
LNG $2,000/mtpa 5 mtpa 75,000 10 49 
 
Table 7 - Comparison of technologies, optimal scale 
In conclusion, the optimal transportation solution will depend on two factors. The effect of the LNG 
flexibility value and pipeline capacity flexibility will be examined in the following segments. Further in 
the analysis, we look at both LNG and pipeline infrastructure, and discuss how different financing 
approaches will affect the overall profitability of these potential developments.       
8.3 Theoretical Framework on Financing Alternatives 
The remaining parts of this chapter are related to financing the infrastructure. In this first segment, we 
will discuss the theoretical framework that is used as a foundation in these assessments.   
8.3.1 Capital Structure 
Modigliani and Miller assert that capital structure is irrelevant for the weighted average cost of capital if 
the following conditions are met (Miller & Modigliani, 1958): 
 No taxes 
 No transaction costs 
 No bankruptcy costs 
 Equivalence in borrowing costs for both companies and investors 
 Symmetry of market information, meaning that companies and investors have the same 
information 
 No effect of debt on a company’s earnings before interests and taxes 
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This theorem is referred to as Modigliani & Miller Proposition II. It explains that the cost of equity 
depends on three things: the required return on the firm’s assets, 𝑅𝐴, the firms cost of debt, 𝑅𝐷, and the 
firms debt-equity ratio, 𝐷/𝐸. (Ross, et.al, 2006) 
 
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑅𝐴 + (𝑅𝐴 − 𝑅𝐷) ∗ (𝐷/𝐸) 
Equation 1 - M&M Proposition II 
 
The required return on the firm’s assets, 𝑅𝐴, is equal to the weighted average cost of capital, 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶. 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 is given by the following equation (Stephen A. Ross, 2006): 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = (
𝐸
𝑉
) ∗ 𝑅𝐸 + (
𝐷
𝑉
) ∗ 𝑅𝐷 
Equation 2 - Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
 
Where 𝑉 is the value of the firm’s assets, 𝐸 is the value of equity, and 𝐷 is the value of debt.  
 
Combining M&M Proposition II with the WACC formula, shows that the 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 does not depend on the 
debt-equity ratio. The change in capital structure weights, 𝐸/𝑉 and 𝐷/𝑉, is exactly offset by the change 
in the cost of equity, 𝑅𝐸, so the 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 remains unchanged.  
 
In order to make investors willing to finance a project, it has to generate a return that is greater than the 
weighted average cost of capital. When introducing taxes, leverage is relevant for determining the 
optimal capital structure, and the corresponding minimum weighted average cost of capital. This is 
because of the interest tax shield, which is the tax saving attained by a corporation from interest 
expenses (Ross et.al, 2006). The fact that interest is deductible for tax purposes generates a tax saving 
equal to the interest payments multiplied by the effective tax rate. For offshore activities on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf, the effective tax rate is 78 per cent9. Hence, the effect of leverage on the 
weighted average cost of capital is substantial.  The static theory of capital structure states that a firm 
borrows up to a point where the tax benefit for an extra dollar in debt is exactly equal to the cost that 
comes from the increased probability of financial distress.  
                                                          
9 Both LNG and pipeline infrastructure is considered offshore activity  
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𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = (
𝐸
𝑉
) ∗ 𝑅𝐸 + (
𝐷
𝑉
) ∗ 𝑅𝐷 ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝑐) 
Equation 3 - Post tax WACC 
Where 𝑉 is the value of the firm’s assets, 𝐸 is the value of equity, 𝐷 is the value of debt, and 𝑇𝑐 is the 
effective corporate tax rate. 
 
 
Figure 21 - The Static Theory of Capital Structure (Stephen A. Ross, 2006)10 
Everything equal, reducing the WACC increases the net present value (NPV) of the project. However, the 
goal when determining capital structure for gas infrastructure is not to maximize NPV, but to minimize 
the tariffs/tolling fees required. The objective is that the value creation should happen when producing 
the resources, and not be captured in the infrastructure (The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013, 
p.6-7). For evaluating infrastructure alternatives, we argue that tariffs/tolling fees should be set to a 
level that gives the project an internal rate of return (IRR) equal to the WACC. In other words, we look at 
what level the tariff/tolling fees need to be in order to make the NPV of the infrastructure project equal 
to zero. 
                                                          
10 D*/E* marks the optimal capital structure 
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8.3.2 Project Finance 
In this section, we argue that a project finance approach will reduce the weighted average cost of 
capital. Project finance is the structured financing of a specific economic entity, referred to as the 
project company or a special purpose vehicle (SPV) (Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, 2013). 
Brealey, Cooper and Habib (1996) and Kim and Yoo (2008) characterize project finance by all of the 
following conditions occurring together: separate incorporation, non-recourse debt, high debt levels, 
detailed long term contracts, and the use of the incorporated entity to fund a single-purpose capital 
asset with finite life whose composition is not altered during the course of the entity’s life (Sawant, 
2010).    
 
Figure 22 - Example of project finance structure 
Under normal circumstances, a company that wants to launch a new investment project would finance 
it on-balance sheet. Setting up a separate project company is costly as it requires extensive due-
diligence and legal contracts covering every aspect of asset governance and monitoring (Sawant, 2010). 
However, under some conditions project finance can reduce the cost of capital and thus be beneficial 
compared to corporate finance (Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, 2013).     
 
Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition II regarding capital structure irrelevance also apply to project finance 
transactions. The theory initially relates to the trade-off between debt and equity, but is also applicable 
in our case where we look at off balance sheet financing. 
 
With real world market conditions, there are clear deviations from the conditions required for M&M 
Prop II to hold. The theorem holds in a world with no taxes, while the project analyzed in this thesis is 
subject to 78 per cent effective tax rate. Still, the M&M propositions provide a valuable intuition that is 
applicable under real world conditions, which is that the source of the funds or the number of funding 
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sources does not change the underlying distributable cash flows (Stephen A. Ross, 2006). The question is 
then; does off-balance sheet financing provide any advantages compared to a traditional corporate 
finance approach?    
 
For off-balance sheet financing to make sense, the asset needs, for some reason, to be worth more off 
balance sheet then on (Giddy, 1999). In other words, for our model to be superior compared to 
financing the infrastructure as a traditional offshore project, where the full amount of capital is raised 
on-balance sheet by the individual owners of the license, the cash flows from tariffs need to be worth 
more if administered by a SPV. If this is the case, the tariff/tolling fees can be reduced without making 
the NPV negative. Miller's analogy to illustrate the principle uses a pizza: cutting a pizza into a smaller or 
larger number of pieces does not change the underlying amount of pizza. (Slegel, 1998) 
 
We argue that raising capital for this project off balance sheet in a project finance structure is superior 
for the following reasons: 
 
1. Project finance allows for a high level of risk allocation among the projects participants. 
Therefore, this approach can support a debt-to-equity ratio that could not otherwise be attained 
(Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, 2013).  Debt provides a superior governance 
structure compared to equity in the case of infrastructure assets. It helps solving the problem of 
monitoring managers by forcing operational efficiency in order to meet scheduled and legally 
binding interest and principal payments. Debt also helps force free cash flow to be paid out to 
capital providers and prevents managerial waste. Further, debt matches infrastructure asset 
characteristics and is a less costly form of governance since these assets have limited growth 
options, which do not require intrusive and discretionary management (Sawant, 2010).  
 
2. Possible correlation in returns between the infrastructure project and the operations of O&G 
companies. This reduces the coinsurance effect of incorporating the infrastructure project on 
the balance sheet of O&G companies. High correlation, and thus a higher risk of bankruptcy, can 
result in the agency problem referred to as risk shifting for O&G companies. Risk shifting means 
that managers will have an incentive to pursue risky investments, possibly with negative NPV, as 
the upside goes to equity holders (and managers) while the downside is carried by debt holders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The threat of risk shifting induces new debt holders to pay less for 
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the O&G companies’ debt, reducing their firm value. In this instance, separate incorporation 
leads to higher firm value because separation eliminates the probability of risk shifting, which 
induces new debt holders to pay more for the firm’s debt and accept a lower yield. (Sawant, 
2010).  
 
We argue that there is a positive correlation in returns between the assets of the O&G 
companies and the infrastructure project. The willingness to invest in exploration and new field 
developments is positively correlated with the oil price, which directly affects the returns for 
O&G companies. This means that if oil prices are low, fewer fields will be developed resulting in 
lower utilization of the infrastructure. Low utilization of the infrastructure means low returns for 
the infrastructure project.     
 
3. Off-balance sheet financing will possibly provide better access to capital, as small and medium 
sized O&G companies will have difficulties raising capital for their share in the project. In the 
case of low credit rated companies, raising capital on their own books is likely to be more 
expensive compared to raising capital through a SPV. (Ledesma, Young, & Holmes, 2012)   
 
4. Off balance sheet financing, allows O&G companies to shield their other assets from creditors, 
making them more willing to participate in the project. (Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and 
Practice, 2013) 
 
We believe that the benefits given by the arguments above outweigh the disadvantages of the high 
costs in setting up the project company and the corresponding legal structure. The fact that in excess of 
70 per cent of the capital for LNG liquefaction projects has been raised using project finance supports 
this argument (Ledesma, Young, & Holmes, 2012). Figure 23 displays the benefits of project finance in 
the theoretical framework.    
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Figure 23 - Corporate finance and Project finance comparison11 
In addition to reducing the cost of capital will the high level of risk allocation between project 
participants allow O&G companies to attain a risk return profile that suits their preferences. Investing in 
infrastructure is associated with low risk and low return, making it an undesirable investment for O&G 
companies as these characteristics deviate from their other assets. However, a project finance 
transaction allows for high leverage, making the equity sponsors able to attain an expected return their 
shareholders can accept.  
8.3.3 Infrastructure Asset Characteristics 
All infrastructure assets share some common characteristics. This section will present the key economic 
characteristics and risks associated with investing in infrastructure assets.  
8.3.1.1 Key Characteristics 
In an investor’s portfolio, an asset class is a group of assets that exhibit similar characteristics, behave 
similarly in different market environments, and are governed by the same laws and regulations (Sawant, 
2010). Infrastructure projects are capital assets. Such assets are assets that are an ongoing source of 
something of value (Sawant, 2010). The value is a stream of expected cash flow, and consequently 
                                                          
11 D*/E* marks the optimal capital structure 
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capital assets are valued using discounted cash flow models.  The key characteristics of the 
infrastructure capital asset are:  
 
Large up-front investments 
Unlike many other assets, an investor investing in infrastructure cannot meet the capital expenditures 
from revenues (Sawant, 2010). The revenues from infrastructure projects are first generated when the 
entire capital expenditure is placed and the project is completed. Until then, the infrastructure owner 
does not receive any cash flow.  Infrastructure projects also need large up-front investments due to the 
economies of scale related to the financial success of such projects. Large investments are required to 
obtain the preferable economies of scale.   
 
Strong and stable cash flow 
Another common characteristic of infrastructure assets is strong cash flows generated from high 
operating margins and large free cash flows. One of the explanations of the strong cash flows is the low 
variable costs associated with infrastructure projects. Apart from the recognizable strong cash flows and 
high operating margins, infrastructure also provides the owners with stable and predictable cash flows. 
The stable cash flows are a result of the monopolistic nature of the asset, the inelastic demand for 
infrastructure, and the lack of relevant substitutes.  
 
Long life 
The cash flow generated by an infrastructure investment is maintained for a long period. The long asset 
life tends to balance the initial capital intensity and sunk cost related to the large up-front investment.  
8.3.1.2 Risks  
Infrastructure projects face different risks during the various phases of the project lifetime. When 
assessing risk measures for infrastructure project it is important to go much further than just backward-
looking volatility statistics, but also understand that certain factors are just genuinely uncertain (Inderst, 
2010). For infrastructure projects and companies key risks include: 
 
Construction and completion risk 
When financing an infrastructure asset, the stakeholders are concerned with the risks of the asset not 
being constructed according to the required performance standards and completed on time (Gatti, 
Identifying project risks, 2013). Some common risk factors associated with the construction and 
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completion of the asset are: the quality of the labor employed, the availability of labor and project 
material, cost overruns, time delays, insolvency of contractors and subcontractors, and unproven 
engineering.  
 
Technological Risk 
Technological risk arises when the contractor of the project and the technology supplier do not coincide, 
and the specific license, valid in theory, proves inapplicable in the real world (Gatti, Identifying project 
risks, 2013). Typical technological risks arise in projects involving innovative, new, and unproven 
methods that have not been adequately tested.  
 
Operational Risk 
This is associated with the infrastructure asset technically underperforming post completion of the 
asset. Such underperformance can potentially lead to operational cost overruns, low operating 
productivity, low managerial efficiency, and higher and more frequent maintenance cost (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2002).  
 
Counterparty risk 
Counterparty risk is concerned with the financial strength and credit quality of the various parties 
involved in the financing and construction of the infrastructure asset.  The creditworthiness of the 
contractor, input supplier, and the user of the asset is assessed through extensive due diligence 
processes.  
 
Revenue risk 
Revenue risk is associated with the volatility of prices and demand shortfall. It denotes the risk that the 
revenues generated by the asset are less than expected (Gatti, Identifying project risks, 2013). A great 
deal of emphasis should be placed on the competitive landscape in which the infrastructure asset 
operates. Sudden changes in market factors can significantly decrease the value of the infrastructure 
asset.  
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Inflation and financing risk 
This risk arises when the cost dynamic is subject to sudden acceleration that cannot be transferred to a 
corresponding increase in revenues. Financing risk arises from inadequate hedging of revenue streams 
and financing costs (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). 
 
Regulatory Risk 
Regulatory risk arises when local governments impose unfavorable changes that harm the value of the 
assets. Examples include government imposed legal changes, such as expropriation or nationalization of 
the infrastructure asset.  
 
Force Majeure Risk 
This risk is associated with the occurrence of natural (earthquakes, landslides) and unforeseen 
(terrorism, war) events that interrupt the expected course of the project. Assessing force majeure risk is 
a very difficult exercise, since estimating the probability and consequence of such events is challenging.   
 
8.4 Pipeline Infrastructure 
In this segment, we will evaluate the pipeline (“Barentspipe”) as a transportation alternative for the 
natural gas resources in the Barents Sea. First, we assess the specific risks of the pipeline alternative and 
suggest possible risk allocations and mitigations. Following the risk assessment, we look closer at the 
various components of the projected cash flow. Finally, we suggest a project finance model as a 
potential financing alternative, in which we apply the theoretical framework presented. 
 
8.4.1 Risks and Mitigations 
Lenders would never accept financing an SPV subject to risks that are completely internalized (Jacobsen, 
interview, 06.05.15). This means that major risks cannot be retained in the SPV, but has to be 
transferred to counterparties or professional agents whose core business is risk management (insurers). 
In accordance with the infrastructure risks introduced in the theoretical framework, the following 
identify the risks the project faces and discuss how these should be allocated between the parties 
involved in the project. 
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Completion Risk 
The risk of delayed completion, cost overruns and performance deficiency is always present in O&G gas 
projects. In a project finance transaction, the SPV or its lenders rarely carry construction and completion 
risk. As a result, it is the engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contractor or the sponsors 
that must carry this risk. We argue that it might be challenging to find an EPC contractor willing to carry 
the full risk of cost overruns and delays, as would be the case under a Turnkey construction contract 
(TKCC). This means that the sponsors either will have to guarantee for the full amount of debt until the 
project is completed, so called “hell or high water guarantees,” or provide an obligation to fund cost 
overruns. The lenders ability to take recourse in the sponsors’ assets will be eliminated once the project 
is complete and proves functional.       
 
However, the EPC contractor should carry parts of the construction risk in the form of penalties if 
milestones regarding cost and timing are not reached. This ensures that the contractor and sponsors 
interests are aligned.    
 
Considering that there already is 7980 km of subsea pipelines on the NCS, the technology for 
construction is well proven. There are several contractors with decades of experience from similar 
pipeline projects. The harsh Arctic weather conditions might increase the risk of delays, as pipelay 
vessels will not be able to operate when wave heights exceed 4 meters and wind speed exceeds 30 
knots (GustoMSC, 2012). However, wind and weather conditions in the Barents and North Sea are quite 
similar. Therefore, we believe that the completion risk is limited.  
 
Technological Risk 
Transporting natural gas via subsea pipelines utilizes well-proven technologies, resulting in limited 
technological risk. The required on-shore processing facility we believe is subject to somewhat higher 
technical risk, because of the harsh Artic environment in which is must be located. However, the 
processing facility is limited in its complexity compared to many other O&G installations located in 
similar environments. Thus, we believe that the contractors in cooperation with the projects sponsors 
will be able to find solutions that limit the probability of unforeseen technical challenges.  
 
66 
 
Still, unforeseen technical challenges can arise, and we argue this risk must be carried by the contractors 
to the largest possible extent. Allocating risk to the responsible EPC contractor is done by TKCCs, where 
the EPC contractor guarantees that the project will meet the predetermined specifications.   
 
Operational Risk 
Once completed, Barentspipe will be incorporated in the existing transportation system that Gassco 
operates (Gassco,2014). Gassco will be responsible for the technical operation of the pipeline and 
administering the additional volumes in the existing Gassled system. The processing facility will be 
operated by a technical service provider (TSP) on behalf of Gassco. The role as TSP will be assigned to 
one of the O&G companies sponsoring the project. 
 
The operational regularity in the Gassled system was 99.92 per cent in 2014 (Gassco, 2014b) Regularity 
is measured as volumes delivered to the receiving terminals in comparison to volumes booked by the 
shippers. Of the gas delivered and NGL produced, 99.99 per cent satisfied the buyers’ demands 
regarding quality of the products. Based on these figures we believe that the operational risk is very 
limited, and thus can be carried by the SPV.         
 
Counterparty Risk 
As a pipeline from the Barents Sea would be connected to the Gassled infrastructure, which provides 
large flexibility in terms of where the gas can be delivered, we argue that the risk related to offtake is 
limited. The creditworthiness of the contractor and the sponsors, as they must provide a guarantee to 
cover cost overruns, represents the major share of counterparty risk. The required obligation to fund 
cost overruns in the construction phase limit the number of O&G companies able to participate in this 
project. The consortium of sponsors must be comprised of large creditworthy companies that are able 
to make the necessary guarantees to lenders.   
 
Inflation and Financing Risk 
Risk related to interest rates, exchange rates and inflation is present in all project finance transactions. 
All these risks can be reduced by using financial instruments like fixed rate lending, forwards, futures, 
swaps, options and money market hedging (Kisser, 2015). Determining to what degree the SPV should 
use financial instruments to hedge these risks requires an extensive analysis. We will not further assess 
how hedging strategies can be used to stabilize the expected future cash flows. 
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In general, we believe that loans should be in the same currency as the revenues generated by the asset. 
As the tariffs generate revenue in NOK, the loans should be denominated in NOK as well. A substantial 
portion of the capex is likely to be denominated in foreign currencies, which might make it beneficial to 
lock in these expenses using forward contracts (or other instruments) when the investment decision is 
made.       
 
Revenue Risk 
Project finance involves the separation between an existing company and a new industrial project. If the 
project is not successful, project creditors have no (or very limited) claim on the sponsoring (equity) 
firm’s assets and cash flow. The tariff (price) charged for usage of the pipeline services is set ex-ante, 
based on the projected volume throughput. Consequently, there will not be any price volatility and the 
project company’s revenues will depend on the actual volume throughput.  
 
Figure 24, illustrates the volume throughput that will decide the level of the pipeline tariff (“reference 
scenario”).  
 
Figure 24 - Tariff volumes (existing fields and discoveries incl. 2014 exploration results) (Gassco, 2014) 
As seen in the figure, the volumes are split between the western and central part of the Barents Sea. 
Potential volumes from the exploration activity in the Barents Sea Southeast are omitted from the 
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calculations. In order to recover these volumes an additional capital expenditure of MNOK 50,000 is 
needed (Gassco, 2014). Hence, these volumes does not work as a mechanism for increasing the overall 
project IRR, as the additional capex will offset any potential extra revenue generated from the extra 
throughput. The total resource volumes in figure 24 amounts to roughly 212 BCM, in which 97.5 BCM 
derives from undeveloped existing fields and discoveries, 100 BCM from undiscovered resources, and 
14.5 BCM from accelerated volumes at Snøhvit. If a pipeline is in place, some of the resources at the 
Snøhvit field can be transported through the pipeline instead of waiting for available capacity at 
Melkøya.  
 
Today, the total resource deposits of undeveloped discovered resources amounts to 147.1 BCM. As seen 
in table 8, around 47 per cent of these volumes are classified with development not very likely, while the 
remaining 53 per cent holds various classifications. A significant amount of the resources in which 
development is not very likely, are not commercially viable as a direct consequence of the lack of a 
necessary infrastructure solution. Total EPs Norvarg-field, containing 30 BCM, is an example of such 
fields (Taraldsen, 2013). Hence, if the necessary infrastructure solution is in place, a significant portion of 
these fields could be developed. In the reference throughput scenario, 50 per cent of these discoveries 
are expected to change status if the infrastructure comes on stream (Gassco, 2014). Further, we assume 
that 50 per cent of the fields not evaluated will be developed. 
 
Name 
 
Year 
 
Status 
Natural Gas 
Resources (BCM) 
Tornerose 1987 Planning phase 3.7 
Drivis 2014 Planning phase 1.3 
Johan Castberg 2011 Planning phase 12.6 
Goliat 2000 PDO Approved 8 
Skalle 2011 New discoveries, not evaluated 5 
Alta 2014 New discoveries, not evaluated 9.7 
Isfjell 2014 New discoveries, not evaluated 1.5 
Pingvin 2014 New discoveries, not evaluated 12.5 
Hanssen 2014 New discoveries, not evaluated 0.2 
Wisting 2013 New discoveries, not evaluated 1.5 
Alke 1981 Development likely but not clarified 11.4 
Gotha 2014 Development likely but not clarified 11 
N/A N/A Development not very likely 68.8 
Total     147.1 
Table 8 - Undeveloped proven resources in the Barents Sea (NPD fact pages, 2015) 
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In addition to the 97.5 BCMs derived from existing fields and discoveries, and the 14.5 BCM from 
accelerated production at Snøhvit, the reference throughput scenario includes an additional 100 BCM of 
undiscovered resources resulting from the anticipated exploration activity until 2017. Monte Carlo 
simulations performed by Gassco, in cooperation with major O&G-companies operating on the 
continental shelf, estimate an expected value of 200 BCM to be discovered in this period. In the 
reference scenario used when setting the tariff, 50 per cent of these 200 BCM will be developed. The 
200 BCM is well in line with the resource scenarios elaborated upon in chapter 7.  
  
Debt issuers 
As the project company’s only source of revenue is the pipeline-tariff, the debt issuers will not be able to 
take coverage in cash flow generated by other assets. Consequently, the project company’s owners 
need locked-in guaranteed cash flows sufficient to service the debt (Jacobsen, interview, 06.05.15). 
Without committed throughput bookings, the debt issuers will perceive the project as too risky and thus 
not be willing to fund the project. However, if volumes are committed, the size of the debt will largely 
depend on the committed throughput.  
 
To ensure that the suggested project finance model is based on reasonable assumptions, it is important 
that the contractually committed volumes (“guaranteed case”) will be based on transportation needs 
the O&G companies envisage as certain. The P95-estimate for the exploration activity outcome in the 
Barents Sea the coming 3 years is 60 BCM (Gassco, 2014). As explained earlier such estimates are 
generated from Monte Carlo simulations based on play analysis, and show the undiscovered resource 
deposits expected to be recovered with 95 per cent certainty. However, as the size and production 
characteristics and the distance between the discoveries may vary, we have assumed that only 50 per 
cent of the P95 discoveries will be recoverable. Hence, in the project finance model it is assumed that 50 
per cent of the already found fields and discoveries, and 50 per cent of the P95-resource estimates will 
be contractually committed.  
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Figure 25 - Contractual committed volumes used to service project company debt (Gassco, 2014) 
Equity sponsors 
After the contracted volumes have serviced the debt, any excess cash flow will accrue to the equity 
owners. As this excess cash flow is not contractually committed, it is associated with higher risk.  
The equity owners of the project company are compensated for bearing this risk by receiving the 
potential upside. Hence, the equity owners receive a higher expected return than the debt issuers.   
 
Figure 26 illustrate potential contribution of undiscovered resources beyond the P50-estimates used 
when setting the tariff. As seen, the upside potential for the equity owners will be limited to the 
maximum capacity of the pipeline. The total volume flow in figure 26 amounts to roughly 450 BCM. 
These figures are provided by the NPD, and are well within the boundaries of the P50-estimate of 740 
BCM of undiscovered natural gas resources.  
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Figure 26 - Upside scenarioes 2040 & 2050 (Gassco, 2014) 
In order to allow for potential volumes in excess of the original pipeline capacity, an extra compressor 
can potentially increase the capacity of the pipeline with additional 27 MSm3/day. Figure 27 illustrates 
the throughput scenario if an additional compressor is added in 2028. In this scenario the total amount 
of volume flow in the pipeline amounts to 680BCM.   
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Figure 27 - Compression upside scenario (Gassco, 2014) 
Regulatory Risk 
Until recently, the political and regulatory risks on the NCS have been perceived as negligible. However, 
recent moves by the Norwegian government have damaged Norway’s reputation concerning regulative 
stability. Historically, the tariffs in the transportation system have been set ex-ante in such a manner 
that it provides the owners with a rate of return corresponding to 7 per cent (Moræus Hanssen, 
interview, 04.02.2015). However, in 2013 the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy proposed changes in the 
pipeline tariff regime. The changes are only affecting new transportation agreements, and not already 
agreed contracts. MPE justifies the decision by arguing that lower tariffs in the transportation system is 
necessary to realize the goals of socioeconomic resource management (The Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, 2013, p.6-7).   
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As seen in the table 9, most of the tariffs in the transportation system are reduced by 90 per cent. The 
significant reduction of the K-element caught the Gassled owners by surprise, which had acquired the 
E&P companies’ shares in Gassled two years prior to the tariff change. The new owners’ response has 
resulted in an ongoing lawsuit between the Gassled owners and the Norwegian government.  
 
If the decision is not overturned, the Gassled owners will not consider buying out the initial investors of 
Polarled, an ongoing pipeline project costing MNOK 24,100. In February 2014, Allianz pleaded Erna 
Solberg to reverse the changes in tariffs which where referred to as "an incomprehensible discrimination 
of long term investors". According to Bloomberg, Allianz alone booked a write-down on their investment 
in Gassled of 500 million euros because of the changes in tariffs (Holter, 2014) 
  
Upon the announcement regarding the proposed tariff changes, bonds issued by Njord Gas 
Infrastructure was downgraded from A- to BBB by S&P (Njord, 2013). In the ratings review, Standard and 
Poor’s explained: “We are lowering our long-term issue ratings on the bonds issued by Njord due to the 
continuing lack of transparency in the process launched by the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum & 
Energy, and the impact this has on our view of the future stability and predictability of the regulatory 
regime” (Njord, 2013).  When the tariff changes was adopted in June 2013, the bonds were further 
downgraded from BBB to BB (Njord, 2013a). The downgrading of the bonds issued by Njord shows the 
direct economic consequences of the changes in the tariffs. 
  
 
Area Unit K-tariff for former contractual agreements K-tariff for new contractual agreements 
A Øre/Sm3 5,5 0,55 
B Øre/Sm3 3,5 0,35 
C - extraction Øre/Sm3 10 1 
D - entry       
Kollsnes Øre/Sm3 1,93 0 
Kårstø Øre/Sm3 2,43 0 
Nyhamna Øre/Sm3 0 0 
Oseberg Øre/Sm3 2,43 0 
Other Øre/Sm3 0,43 0 
D exit Øre/Sm3 5,57 0,71 
F Øre/Sm3 6 6 
G Øre/Sm3 1,49 0,149 
H Øre/Sm3 3,5 0,35 
I Øre/Sm3 4,05 4,05 
Table 9 - Overview of tariffs in the Gassled system (The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013) 
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The sudden changes in the tariff system have shown that the regulatory risk is necessary to address 
when evaluating the project. In collaboration with the World Economic Forum, The Boston Consulting 
Group has done extensive research on the mitigation of regulatory risk in infrastructure projects. A 
measure suggested by the BCG that can deal with regulatory risk in the Norwegian pipeline system, is 
the ownership and financial structure of the transaction. By drafting these structures with great care 
and attention, selecting the right partners and project participants can considerably mitigate the 
regulatory risk (Almeida & Rodrigues, 2015). One suggestion is to invite international owners, e.g. the 
infrastructure funds and financiers, such as the European Investment Bank, to participate in the project. 
The Norwegian government would then have to contend with large international institutions and banks, 
if sudden regulation of the asset is in disfavour of the owners. Such an ownership model is to some 
extent already implemented, as the equity owners of Gassled are large international pension -and 
infrastructure funds. Inviting international banks as financiers will make it more difficult for the 
Norwegian government to conduct changes in the regulation of the transportation system (Almeida & 
Rodrigues, 2015). Inviting domestic credit institutions, such as DNB, as financiers of the project can 
make it more difficult to suggest changes in the tariffs. Considering the potential leverage of the project, 
changes in the tariffs, and potential loss of debt repayments can considerably hurt the domestic credit 
institution.  
  
The changes in the tariff system performed by the Norwegian government have proved that the 
regulatory risk in the transportation system is not negligible. The ongoing lawsuit can potentially have a 
significant effect on the availability of equity sponsors and lenders in the transportation system. 
 
8.4.2 Project Internal Rate of Return 
As mentioned earlier, the MPE has historically set the tariffs so that the pipeline projects yield a return 
of 7 per cent based on the anticipated reference throughput. However, the current Gassled owners 
suggest the required IRR for the Barentspipe project to be 10 per cent (Pedersen & Georgsen, interview, 
19.03.15). In addition to increased regulatory risk, the higher required return comes as a result of more 
uncertainty related to the throughput compared to other pipeline projects on the continental shelf. 
Further, the possibility of O&G companies making contractual commitments to secure debt repayments 
was not discussed. The possible benefit of alternative financing structures was neither accounted for 
when stating the 10 per cent return threshold.  
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According to DNB, who have extensive experience in financing similar projects, a project IRR of 10 per 
cent is too high for infrastructure projects of this character. In a project finance structure with high 
leverage, a required rate of return of 10 per cent will indicate that the project is associated with too 
much risk for a commercial bank to issue debt. (Jacobsen, interview, 06.05.2015) 
 
We believe that the risks associated with the Barentspipe project will require an IRR of 8 per cent given 
full utilization of the benefits of project finance, as explained in subchapter 8.3.  
 
Figure 28 shows that the other pipeline projects on the NCS have a lower IRR than what is required for 
the Barentspipe project. We argue that this is caused by other pipeline projects being constructed with 
less volatility in terms of cash flow projections, as they were built in connection to much greater 
discoveries in terms of recoverable resources.  
 
Figure 28 - IRR for various pipeline projects (Nørve, 2013) 
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8.4.3 Cost Overview 
The cost estimate for the pipeline alternative is based on information gathered form published reports, 
interviews with industry experts, and our own assumptions.  
 
Capital Expenditures 
The total capex of the 42-inch pipeline, covering the approximately 1000 km from Haltenbanken in the 
Norwegain Sea to the Barents Sea, is estimated to MNOK 75,000. This estimate is made by the BSGI-
forum, and has been verified by one of the lead authors of the report (Aarhus, e-mail, 19.05.15). The 
capex estimate includes processing and compression capacity equal to the initial capacity of the pipeline 
of 45 MSm3/day. Further increasing compression can give the pipeline a capacity of 72 MSm3/day, which 
will cost an additional MNOK 6,000.   
 
Capacity (42-inch pipeline) Capex (MNOK) 
72 MSm3/day 81,000 
45 MSm3/day 75,000 
 
Table 10 - Capex for various capacities of 42-inch pipeline (Gassco, 2014) 
Table 9 benchmarks the capex of MNOK 75,000 against the cost of similar subsea pipeline projects, and 
find that the Barentspipe capex is just above average when comparing cost/capacity adjusted for length. 
Removing the outliers, Langeled and Medgaz, give an average of $213/BCM/meter, compared to $222 
for the Barentspipe.   
Cast capacity 
rank 
 
Project 
Length 
(km) 
Capacity 
(BCM) 
Diameter 
(Inch) 
Capex 
(MUSD) 
 
USD/BCM/meter 
1 Langeled 1,166 26 44 2,720 91.5 
2 Europipe 2 642 24 42 1,690 109.7 
3 Franpipe 840 19 42 1,866 116.9 
4 North Stream 1,222 55 4x48 11,264 167.6 
5 South Stream 925 63 4x32 12,800 219.6 
6 Barentspipe 1,000 45 42 10,000 222.2 
7 Blue Stream 396 16 2x24 1,700 268.3 
8 ITGI 217 10 32 640 294.9 
9 Europipe 1 670 18 40 3,750 310.9 
10 Medgaz 210 8 24 806 479.8 
 
Table 11 - Cost/capacity benchmark of various pipeline projects (detailed list of sources in the appendix) 
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Operating cost 
Gassco publishes the operating cost in the existing pipeline system each year. We have assumed that 
there is a linear relationship between the length of a pipeline and the operating costs. Thus, we have 
based or operating cost estimate on the Åsgard Transport pipeline and adjusted for the difference in 
length. The Åsgard transport pipeline is quite similar to the Barentspipe in relation to diameter and 
length.  
   
Diameter 
(inches) 
Capacity 
(MSm3/day) 
Operating costs 
(NOK/Sm3) 
Operating cost 
($/Mbtu)   
Length 
(km) 
Åsgard Transport 707 42 70 0.0037 0.0140 
Barentspipe 1,000 42 45 0.0052 0.0183 
 
Table 12 - Operating cost estimate (Gassco, 2015) 
We have not adjusted for the fact that Åsgard transport has higher capacity. As higher capacity requires 
more compression, it can be argued that our estimate for Barentspipe is at the high end.  
Taxes 
The taxes related to investing in the pipeline are calculated using the equation in table 13. 
 
   Revenues (tariff) 
- Operating expenses 
- Linear depreciation for investments (6 years) 
- Net financial costs 
= Ordinary tax base 
- Ordinary tax (27%) 
- Uplift (5,5% of investments for 4 years) 
= Tax base liable to special tax (51%) 
 
Table 13 - Calculation of the petroleum tax (Semmingsen, 2010) 
8.4.4 Project Finance Model  
Project Structure 
In our project finance structure, we suggest a capital structure comprising three types of capital as 
explained in figure 29 below. In addition to bank debt, we suggest the Gassled infrastructure funds as a 
mezzanine capital partner ranking head of the O&G companies as common equity partners.  
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Figure 29 - Barentspipe Company project finance structure 
Figure 30 illustrates the total free cash flow generated by the project. The tax paid is calculated 
assuming the company has no debt, and thus no interest tax shield. As seen, the revenues are first 
generated when the entire capital expenditure is placed and the project is completed. Once completed 
the pipeline generates strong cash flows from high operating margins. In the beginning of the pipeline’s 
lifetime, the SPV will benefit from a tax loss carryforward. As the total capex is depreciated over 6 years, 
the company will not have taxable income in this period. As a result, a tax loss carryforward is created as 
the depreciation exceeds the revenues. In addition, the uplift depreciation charges the first 4 years and 
the high marginal tax rate of 78 per cent increase the size of the tax loss carryforward. Consequently, 
the SPV will not pay any taxes in cash the first 9 years of operation.   
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Figure 30 - Free cash flow to Barentspipe Company 
Project Company Debt 
The Barentspipe Company’s creditors will look to extract a return that corresponds to the level of risk 
associated with their share in the project. As explained earlier, the project company’s creditors cannot 
take recourse in other assets if the project company is not able to service the debt. Hence, contractually 
committed volumes and a resulting more visible cash flow, is a pre-requisite for the lenders to issue any 
debt (Jacobsen, interview, 06.05.15). The contractually committed volumes correspond to the 
“guaranteed” case discussed in subchapter 8.4.1 on risk assessments.   
 
The size of the debt will largely depend on the size of the volume commitments, and consequently the 
creditors’ risk assessments of the project. According to DNB, a project of this kind could achieve close to 
80 per cent leverage if the volume commitments match the cash flow used to service the debt 
(Jacobsen, interview, 06.05.15). Hence, the size of the committed volumes determines the size of the 
issuable debt. Given the anticipated contractual commitments, we suggest that the Barentspipe 
Company will be funded with 60 per cent leverage.   
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The interest charged by the lenders consists of the benchmark rate plus the spread, where the latter 
depends on the project characteristics. The interest rate spread reflects the risk premium, and should 
thus reflect the expected performance of the loan (Kwark, 2002). The 10-year swap LIBOR is used as the 
benchmark rate. Given the project details and size of contractual volumes, DNB indicate an interest 
spread between 200 and 250 bps (Jacobsen, interview, 06.05.15). Thus, we have assumed that a spread 
of 225 bps is placed on the LIBOR providing an interest rate equal to 4.48 per cent.   
 Debt Structure       
Total debt outstanding (MNOK) 45,000 
LIBOR rate (%)   2.23% 
Margin (bps)   225 
Interest rate (%)   4.48% 
Repayment period (yrs)  15 
 
Table 14 - Debt structure 
Further, the debt repayment period is set to 15 years. The relatively short repayment period, compared 
to the pipeline’s lifetime, is a result of the large cash flows being generated early in the project’s 
lifetime. As discussed earlier in this section, the depreciation rules of the Norwegian petroleum tax 
system allow the project company to carry forward large tax shields. Intuitively, one could think that the 
company would repay its debt using all the cash flow generated early in the assets lifetime. However, 
retaining the debt also retains the interest tax shield, reducing the effective cost of capital. In addition, 
the equity sponsors have a preference for high expected returns, leaving it preferable to maintain 
leverage as it increases the risk and return for equity sponsors.   
 
Some of the capital retained will be needed to service a shortfall in distributable cash flow to debt 
holders in year 2036 and 2037. This shortfall comes as a result of the tax loss carryforward no longer 
existing. Figure 31 shows the distributable cash flows from the anticipated committed volumes as well 
as the cash flow required to service debt. As seen in this figure the cash flow generated by the project 
together with the tax shield from the interest expense will be sufficient to service debt until year 2036. 
During the last two years of the debts tenor the debt must be serviced with retained cash or 
alternatively by the equity partners injecting more cash. We will argue that the overall debt service ratio 
is strong, and therefore believe that the project company would be able to obtain the debt financing 
described above.  
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Figure 31 - Guaranteed cash flow available to service debt 
Mezzanine capital 
After the debt is serviced there is still contractually committed cash flow left. The contractually 
committed volumes are of a risk return characteristics that we would argue that does not fit the 
preferences of the O&G companies. We believe that the nature of the O&G companies’ business 
engaged in exploration and early development of oil fields is characterized by high risk and high reward. 
We therefore assume that investors investing in such companies have a preference for higher risk and 
higher returns. Consequently, for the O&G companies to be willing to invest in the pipeline they would 
require a higher return than the contractually committed volumes can offer. Based on the interviews 
with the O&G companies, the owners expressed that, given the characteristics of the Barentspipe 
project, they would require a return of 18-20 per cent on their equity in order to invest. With the 
assumed debt structure, the cash flow after the debt is serviced is not sufficient to obtain such returns. 
Hence, the amount of contractual cash flow left calls for an instrument ranking between the bank debt 
and O&G companies’ equity.  
 
In the project finance model, we suggest the Gassled infrastructure funds invest as mezzanine capital 
partners. Redeemable mezzanine capital is a hybrid financial instrument displaying both debt and equity 
characteristics. The instrument we suggest has a mandatory redemption and dividends (a debt 
characteristic), while at the same time retaining equity characteristics, such as potential appreciation 
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(Kimmel & Warfield, 1995). It is important to stress that the dividends does not share the exact 
commonalities of a coupon payment, as the dividends are not tax deductible on the issuer’s P&L.   
 
The potential appreciation mechanism could for example be a warrant structure, allowing the 
mezzanine capital partner to acquire common equity in the project company at a fixed price. By 
exercising the warrant, the mezzanine capital partner therefore becomes a common equity partner in 
the project company. Thus, if the common equity price is greater than the exercise price of the warrant, 
the mezzanine capital partner will extract additional returns. The exercise price will typically be on a 
significant premium to the price at the date that the warrants are issued. By offering the mezzanine 
capital partner an upside potential, the dividends to the mezzanine capital partner will be lower than 
what would have been the case if there was no upside potential. In this thesis, we will not further assess 
the potential value of such a warrant structure. 
 
We have assumed a mezzanine capital instrument in the amount of 20 per cent of the required total 
capital expenditures. Given that there are some contractually committed volumes left to partly service 
the required dividends and the potential value of the warrant structure, we believe that the Gassled 
infrastructure funds will require a base-case return on their investment of approximately 10 per cent 
(Pedersen & Georgsen, interview, 19.03.15). Further, we have assumed that the mezzanine capital is 
redeemed after 10 years. 
 
Figure 32 illustrates that the cash flows in the reference throughput scenario is sufficient to service the 
dividends to the mezzanine capital. As the figure illustrates the guaranteed cash flows will not be 
sufficient to cover the 11.5 per cent dividends required to provide the infrastructure investors the 10 
per cent return. Hence, there is significantly more risk associated with owning the mezzanine capital 
than debt, and consequently must the infrastructure funds be compensated by higher returns and 
potential upside. 
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Figure 32 - Cash flow mezzanine 
Common Equity 
One of the most important features of the preferred equity is that it is senior to common equity in the 
capital structure. This implies that the common equity is associated with higher risk, and should thus be 
compensated with a higher expected return. Figure 33 illustrates the cash flow left to the O&G 
companies after the debt is serviced and redemption provisions is paid to the preferred equity holders.  
 
Figure 33 - Cash flow available to common equity holders 
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The key observation from figure 33 is that the project generates significant cash flow to the common 
equity partners both from the contracted volumes and especially in the reference case during the first 8 
years of operation. In year 2031 the mezzanine capital will be redeemed, and as discussed above there 
will be a need for additional capital injections from the common equity owners unless some cash is 
retained in the SPV from the 8-year period of significant cash generation.  
 
The contractually committed volumes will provide the common equity holders with a return equal to 1.6 
per cent, which is much lower than their required return of [18-20] per cent. However, ignoring any 
potential exercise of warrants by the mezzanine capital partner, all additional cash flow after service of 
debt and dividends to the mezzanine capital will accrue the common equity holders. If the reference 
throughput is achieved, the common equity holders will receive a return of 19.0 per cent. This estimate, 
based on our interviews with the O&G companies, is in accordance with their return preferences on 
such projects.  
 
Figure 34 summarizes the IRR for the various investors in the Barentspipe Company. By allocating risk 
and return preferences within the capital structure of the company, it is possible to attract various 
investors such that the necessary funds are raised for constructing the pipeline.  
 
Figure 34 - IRR to the capital providers of the Barentspipe Company 
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8.5 LNG Infrastructure 
In this segment, we will evaluate a second LNG-train at Melkøya (Snøhvit) as a transportation alternative 
for the natural gas resources in the Barents Sea. Our risk assessment is based on experiences gleaned 
from LNG projects around the world, with Snøhvit in particular. Commenting of specific technical details 
that may, or may not, be different as a result technical progress, is not within the scope of this thesis.  
8.5.1 Risks and Mitigations 
Completion risk 
The risk of delayed completion, cost overruns, and performance deficiencies is substantial for LNG 
projects. Experiences from Melkøya and other liquefaction projects in the world show that large costs 
overruns and delays in the construction phases are common. Operations at Melkøya started one year 
late, and the liquefaction plant cost 160 per cent more than initially budgeted (Steensen, 2005). The 
Gorgon LNG project in Australia has experienced a cost overrun of MUSD 17,000, and is so far 6 months 
delayed (ABC AU, 2014). The experiences from Melkøya and Gorgon underline the uncertainty related to 
the construction phase of LNG projects.   
 
The construction risk can be reduced by awarding turnkey construction contracts (TKCCs) to large 
creditworthy ECP contractors. Selecting an EPC contractor with a strong track record, regarding timely 
delivery and technical know-how, will reduce the construction risk for the LNG project. It can be argued 
that there has been a steep learning curve since the construction of Melkøya, and that technical issues 
and challenges related to project management, are less significant today. As the second train at Melkøya 
would be a brownfield expansion, the contractors will have extensive knowledge of the geological and 
climatic conditions, making the construction more predictable compared to pioneering greenfield 
projects. Thus, we believe the completion risk for a Snøhvit expansion is lower compared to the risk of 
the first greenfield plant. 
 
However, we still assert that the risks related to delays and cost overruns are higher for a second LNG 
train at Melkøya compared to building a new pipeline. Compared to the pipeline building process, a 
second LNG-train is a much more complex technical solution.   
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Technological risk 
Snøhvit LNG is the northernmost LNG liquefaction facility in the world and is subject to harsh climatic 
conditions. Even though the basic technology is well proven, its location requires the plant to handle 
climatic conditions not present for most other LNG plants. This increases the risk of the plant being 
constructed with technology not able to meet the predetermined requirements, which can result in 
operational deficiency. We believe this risk is present, but limited, as experiences from Snøhvit train 1 
can be utilized.     
 
Operational Risk 
LNG liquefaction utilizes technology that has been used on a commercial scale since the 1960s. Still, the 
liquefaction process is complex and the facility depends on all components satisfying their 
specifications. Snøhvit LNG has experienced unscheduled downtime during the first years of operations 
due to unforeseen technical issues, such as problems with central components in the cooling system 
(Statoil, 2010). The plant is not stronger than its weakest link, and as there are many components, 
achieving high operational regularity can be challenging. However, Snøhvit now has “an operational 
regularity that matches the best in the LNG business” (Gjertsen, 2014). 
 
Again, we believe that a second LNG train at Melkøya will benefit from the experiences acquired during 
the years the existing facility has been in operation.  
 
Counterparty risk 
As LNG is traded in a functioning and growing global spot market there is no risk related to the 
creditworthiness of the final buyers/consumers of the product. As for a pipeline project, the 
creditworthiness of the contractors and sponsors represents the major share of counterparty risk. In 
order to underwrite the development of the facility, the O&G companies and SPV must make 
contractual price commitments. As the LNG tolling fee will not be subject to government regulation, a 
predetermined price is necessary both to secure sufficient revenues for the SPV and to avoid monopoly 
pricing.      
 
Inflation and Financing Risk 
We assert that the risks related to inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates are equal for a pipeline 
and LNG development. Chapter 8.4.1 elaborates on how these risks can be mitigated.  
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Revenue Risk 
As discussed in subchapter 8.4.2, the optimal scale of a LNG facility is at a size that suits the discovered 
commercial resources in the area. As overcapacity is expensive, a potential plant would be built 
supported by several licenses that ensure full capacity utilization for many years.  
 
Figure 35 illustrates the anticipated utilization in a new 5 mtpa LNG train at Melkøya. The guaranteed 
utilization represents the same amount of contractually committed volumes of natural gas as used in 
the assessment of the pipeline alternative. The volumes used when setting the tariff (“tariff setting 
utilization”) amounts to 195 BCM, which gives a utilization rate of 100 per cent in the new LNG facility. 
However, as the LNG processing requires energy to cool the gas, a total of 205 BCM are needed to 
produce the 195 BCM. The total amount of natural gas necessary to maintain the LNG facility at 100 per 
cent utilization is lower than the reference throughput scenario used in the pipeline alternative. Thus, 
the volume risk is lower in the LNG alternative. How this affects the size of debt and equity will be 
discussed in subchapter 8.5.4.  
 
Figure 35 - Volume Scenario LNG Train II 
Regulatory Risk 
An LNG export facility can contribute significantly to employment in the surrounding area and generate 
large tax revenues for the local community. This was part of the reason why the Norwegian government 
granted Snøhvit LNG a special tax break in order to the secure the development. The tax break involved 
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accelerated depreciation of capital expenditures. The construction of the LNG facility was halted two 
months in 2002 as a result of Bellona, an environmental organization, appealing EFTA to investigate the 
tax break as unlawful state aid. The case was however dismissed as the current minister of finance, Per 
Kristian Foss, made the accelerated depreciation a general exception for LNG facilities in Troms and 
Finnmark. We assert that the considerations for the local communities still is high on the political 
agenda, which will make regulatory risk for future LNG projects limited.         
8.5.2 Project Internal Rate of Return 
We believe that given the risks associated with a brownfield LNG facility at Melkøya it is required a 
lower IRR compared to a pipeline. This is because the contractually committed volumes constitute a 
larger share of the reference utilization. As figure 35 indicates, roughly 80 percent of the total utilization 
in the LNG train is contractual volumes. Considering that such substantial part of the total cash flow 
from the new LNG train will be from contractual volumes, it would not be applicable to apply the same 
internal rate of return as in the Barentspipe case. We believe that the higher risk related to construction, 
operations, and technology is compensated for with the significantly lower revenue risk. Hence, we have 
used a total project internal rate of return of 6 per cent. Consequently the tolling fee needs to be set to 
a level that gives the project the suggested IRR. Based on the reference case throughput, this gives a 
tariff of NOK 0.8084/MSm3 .  
8.5.3 Cost Overview  
The cost estimations for the second train at Melkøya are based on information gathered through 
interviews with industry experts, who took part in evaluating the Snøhvit expansion in 2012. We have 
also used industry benchmark studies to crosscheck the estimates we were provided, as well as to 
calculate the operational costs.  
 
Capital Expenditures 
In May 2012, Statoil estimated the capex for an expansion of the Snøhvit LNG terminal at Melkøya to be 
MNOK 52,300 (Pettersen, e-mail, 02.06.15). An expansion of the existing facility is called a brownfield 
expansion, and is viewed as the most feasible alternative for increasing the LNG export capacity in the 
Barents Sea (Tjelta, 2012). Gassco estimated in 2014 that the cost of a new greenfield LNG facility would 
be MNOK 60,000 (Gassco, 2014). Both estimates are for a facility with capacity of 5 mtpa. In subchapter 
8.1.2, we used a benchmark of $2000/tpa, which has been derived from the cost of Snøhvit phase 1 
(Songhurst, 2014). Using this benchmark gives a cost of MNOK 75,000. Further, in our analysis we have 
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used Statoil’s capex estimate of MNOK 52,300, as we believe it is a reasonable assumption that a 
brownfield facility will be less expensive.  
 
Operating Cost 
The following assumptions have been made regarding the operational expenditures for the LNG facility. 
 
Cost element Metric 
Liquefaction energy consumption 5% of feed gas 
Annual operating cost MNOK 1,000 
 
Table 15 - operating cost (Pettersen, e-mail, 02.06.15) 
The liquefaction energy consumption is not a cost in itself, as the alternative price that can be achieved 
for the gas in the region is very limited. Contrary it can be regarded as an efficiency loss, meaning that if 
the gas fields produce 20 MSm3/day, 1 MSm3/day is used in the liquefaction process, and 19 MSm3/day 
can be exported.  
 
As mentioned in subchapter 8.1.2, the shipping cost is a substantial element in the LNG value chain. 
Table 16 illustrate the shipping cost from Snøhvit to the most relevant markets.  
 
Destination Europe Japan India 
Route Direct Via Cape Via Suez Via Arctic Via Cape Via Suez 
Freight cost ($/Mbtu) 0.6 4.6 3.9 3.0 3.8 2.7 
 
Table 16 - Shipping cost from Snøhvit to various destinations (International Energy Agency, 2014b) 
In addition to shipping, the LNG has to be regasified at the point of delivery. Table 17 illustrate the cost 
of regasification in relevant markets.  
  Europe Japan India 
Regasification cost ($/Mbtu) 0.9 0.9 0.7 
 
Table 17 - Regasification cost at various destinations (International Energy Agency, 2014b) 
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Taxes 
The taxes related to investing in the LNG facility are calculated using the equation in table 18. 
Note that the second LNG-train at Melkøya will be subject to accelerated depreciation (3 years instead 
of 6 years). 
   Revenues (tariff) 
- Operating expenses 
- Linear depreciation for investments (3 years) 
- Net financial costs 
= Ordinary tax base 
- Ordinary tax (27%) 
- Uplift (5,5% of investments for 4 years) 
= Tax base liable to special tax (51%) 
Table 18 - Tax calculation for LNG in Troms and Finnmark (Semmingsen, 2010) 
8.5.4 Project Finance Model  
Project Structure 
Figure 36 show the suggested project finance structure for the Barents LNG Infrastructure. As seen, we 
suggest the same structure for the second LNG train, as with the Barentspipe Company.   
 
Figure 36 - Barents LNG Infrastrucutre Company project finance structure 
Figure 37 illustrates the total free cash flow generated by the LNG project. Again, the tax paid is 
calculated assuming the company has no debt, and thus no interest tax shield. As the new LNG train will 
be subject to special depreciation rules (3 years instead of 6 years), the tax loss carryforward will be 
accumulated faster. As discussed in subchapter 8.5.3, the new LNG train has higher operating cost, and 
thus a lower operating margin compared to the pipeline. The most important feature of the second LNG 
train is the low risk related to the revenues. Figure 37 illustrate that almost 80 percent of the revenues 
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generated are contractually committed. This substantially reduces the overall risk of the project, as we 
believe the most significant risk related to the Barents Sea infrastructure is revenue risk. In the 
following, we will elaborate how we can attract the various investors from figure 36 to fund the 
investment in the second train at Melkøya.  
 
Figure 37 - Free cash flow Barents LNG Infrastructure 
Project Company Debt 
As discussed in subchapter 8.5.2, the contractually committed volumes correspond to roughly 80 per 
cent of the total capacity in the new LNG train. Given the anticipated contractual commitments, we 
suggest that the Barents LNG Infrastructure Company will be funded with 70 per cent leverage, which is 
10 per cent higher than for the pipeline. As explained earlier the creditors will look to extract a return 
that corresponds to the level of risk associated with their share in the share in the project. The creditors 
risk is reflected in the cost of debt. We assert that the increased total share of committed volumes will 
offset the higher leverage, meaning that the cost of debt will be the same as for the pipeline case. 
 Debt Structure       
Total debt outstanding (MNOK) 36,610 
LIBOR rate (%)   2.23% 
Margin (bps)   225 
Interest rate (%)   4.48% 
Repayment period (yrs)  12 
 
Table 19 - Debt structure 
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Further, the debt repayment period is set to 12 years. The relatively short repayment period, compared 
to the LNG train’s lifetime, is a result of the large cash flows being generated early in the project’s 
lifetime. As discussed earlier in subchapter 8.4.4, the depreciation rules of the Norwegian petroleum tax 
system allow the project company to depreciate the asset over a 3 year period resulting in large carry 
forward tax benefits. As the equity sponsors have a preference for higher risk and expected returns, 
maintaining leverage is preferable for equity sponsors. In addition retaining debt will also increase the 
interest tax shield and reduce the overall cost of capital. Hence, a shorter debt repayment period would 
not be beneficial for the project company. 
 
Figure 38 show the distributable cash flows from the anticipated committed volumes as well as the cash 
flow required to service debt. The figure shows that the cash flow generated by the project together 
with the tax shield from the interest expense will be sufficient to service debt until year 2033.  As the 
project cash flow is not sufficient to service the debt and interest repayment in 2034, meaning that 
some of the capital retained from previous years will be needed to service the debt holders in 2034. As 
explained earlier the short fall in distributable cash flow is a result of the tax loss carryforward no longer 
existing. Again, we argue that the overall debt service ratio is strong, and believe that the project 
company would be able to obtain the debt financing described above.  
 
 
 
Figure 38 - Cash flow available to service debt 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
3
2
0
2
4
2
0
2
5
2
0
2
6
2
0
2
7
2
0
2
8
2
0
2
9
2
0
3
0
2
0
3
1
2
0
3
2
2
0
3
3
2
0
3
4
2
0
3
5
2
0
3
6
2
0
3
7
2
0
3
8
2
0
3
9
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
1
2
0
4
2
2
0
4
3
2
0
4
4
2
0
4
5
2
0
4
6
2
0
4
7
2
0
4
8
2
0
4
9
2
0
5
0
M
N
O
K
Project cash flow Tax benefit from interest expense Debt repayments Interest payments
93 
 
Mezzanine capital 
Considering the substantial amount of contractual volumes left after the debt is serviced, the risk and 
return characteristics of the remaining cash flow does not fit the preferences of the O&G companies. In 
the LNG project finance model, we again suggest the Gassled infrastructure funds as mezzanine capital 
partners. We have assumed a mezzanine capital instrument amounting to 25 per cent of the required 
total capital expenditures. Compared to the pipeline case, the majority of cash flow left after the debt is 
serviced is contractually committed. Although there is more risk associated with owning the mezzanine 
capital than owning debt, the risk borne by the infrastructure funds is significantly less than in the 
pipeline project. Hence the required rate of return for the mezzanine financing should be lower than in 
the pipeline example.  
 
As there is less revenue risk, the mezzanine financing will be cheaper compared to the pipeline project. 
Hence, we suggest a base case internal return of return of 8 percent for the mezzanine equity providers. 
We assume that the mezzanine capital partners will receive some upside potential as discussed in 
subchapter 8.4.4. The IRR of 8 per cent is compatible with our discussions with the current infrastructure 
owners (Pedersen & Georgsen, interview, 19.03.15). Further, we have assumed that the mezzanine 
capital is redeemed after 10 years. Figure 39 illustrates that the cash flows in the reference throughput 
scenario is sufficient to service the dividends to the mezzanine capital.  
 
As with the Barentspipe company, the mezzanine capital will be redeemed in 2031, and there will be a 
need for additional capital injections from the common equity owners unless some cash is retained in 
the SPV from the 11-year period of significant cash generation.  
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Figure 39 - Cash flow mezzanine 
Common Equity 
As with the Barentspipe company, the mezzanine capital will be redeemed in 2031, and there will be a 
need for additional capital injections from the common equity owners unless some cash is retained in 
the SPV from the 11-year period of significant cash generation.  
 
The contractually committed volumes will provide the common equity holders with a return equal to 
10.7 per cent, which is lower than their required return of 18-20 per cent. If the reference throughput is 
achieved, the common equity holders will get a return of 24.4 per cent that, based on our interviews, is 
in accordance with their return preferences on such projects. Hence, in order to obtain the preferred 
risk and return profile on their investments the O&G companies will need to obtain an overall leverage 
(debt and mezzanine capital) as high as 95%. 
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Figure 40 - Cash flow available to common equity holders 
Figure 41 summarizes the IRR for the various investors in the Barents LNG Infrastructure. By allocating 
risk and return preferences within the capital structure of the company, various investors can be 
attracted such that the necessary funds are raised in order to construct the pipeline.  
 
Figure 41 -IRR to the capital providers of the Barents LNG Infrastructure 
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9.1 Viability of developing the resources 
The assessments in the previous chapters provide the following estimates regarding the profitability of 
developing the Barents Sea natural gas resources.  
 
 
Pipeline ($/Mbtu) Europe   
Market price  8.0   
Cost of field development 3.9   
Cost of infrastructure 2.8   
Margin 1.3   
    
LNG  ($/Mbtu) Europe Japan India 
Market price 8.0 10.0 10.0 
Cost of field development 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Cost of infrastructure 3.1 3.1 3.1 
Cost of shipping 0.6 3.0 2.7 
Cost of regasification 0.9 0.9 0.7 
Margin -0.5 -0.9 -0.4 
Table 20 - Profitability of developing the Barents Sea natural gas resources 
Table 20 shows that a pipeline from the Barents Sea is a profitable solution for developing the Barents 
Sea natural gas resources. In order for a second LNG train to be a more profitable solution, the prices in 
Asia need to be at a premium of $3.7/Mbtu compared to European prices. However, that fact that the 
project is profitable does not necessarily guarantee that the pipeline will be constructed. The reason 
being the timing paradox discussed in chapter 3.1.  
9.2 Solving the timing paradox 
9.2.1 Contractual booking commitments  
As discussed in chapter 8, the development of the infrastructure solutions relies on the assumption that 
the O&G companies are willing to make contractual volume commitments in advance. This will involve 
making commitments beyond the transportation needs from existing fields and discoveries. Our 
discussions with O&G companies on this subject suggest that they are not willing to make such 
9 Conclusions 
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commitments at this point in time. Viste-Solheim at Eon explains that “Currently, I do not believe that 
there are any O&G companies willing to commit paying for capacity before they are 100 per cent certain 
that they have discoveries supporting these potential transportation needs” (Solheim, e-mail, 07.07.15). 
Rummelhoff in ConocoPhillips further support Solheim’s argument “Given what happened with Polarled, 
where many of the gas discoveries making the foundation for the investment were significantly 
postponed, I have difficulties believing that O&G companies are eager to commit volumes and 
corresponding liabilities to pay tariffs, in a new Barentspipe” (Rummelhoff, e-mail, 07.05.15). Our 
discussions with O&G companies indicate that the earliest possible time of making such commitments is 
when the plan for development and operations (PDO) is delivered. “I do not think OMV will make 
volume commitments before the Wisting development is certain and the PDO is delivered” (Bogen, e-
mail, 22.05.2015).  
 
Even though our assessments indicate that it is possible to profitably develop the resources in the 
Barents Sea, the O&G companies lack of willingness to commit to contractual bookings make it hard to 
realize the project. Thus, the timing paradox remains unsolved, resulting in the resources not being 
developed.   
9.2.2 State financing 
To solve the timing paradox someone needs to make the first move, either by actively exploring the 
Barents Sea for natural gas without a clear plan for how potential discoveries can be made commercial, 
or by building the required infrastructure without knowing whether sufficient volumes to justify the 
investment will be discovered. The government already funds 78 per cent of exploration expenses 
through the tax system since they are tax deductible. To increase exploration activity, the Norwegian 
government introduced in 2004 a system where companies without taxable income could get a cash 
refund for exploration expenses. We believe that further increasing the incentives for exploration can 
create negative side effects, as it allows O&G companies to take risks as the Norwegian government 
carries the majority of the downside. Making the Norwegian government carry a larger share of 
exploration costs can also lead to a lack of cost control in the O&G companies.  
 
Consequently, solving the timing paradox with more exploration might prove difficult. However, another 
possible solution is for the Norwegian government to incentivize building or to finance the 
infrastructure. The Norwegian government holds the unique position of being equally invested in all 
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parts of the value chain on the continental shelf, as a result of all offshore activities being subject to the 
same 78 per cent tax rate. This means that as long as the total development is profitable, it is also 
profitable for the Norwegian government. Therefore, it can be argued that the Norwegian government 
should take the first move to solve the timing paradox by financing the infrastructure. The tariffs 
charged should, as in the project finance model, reflect the risks of this investment making the tariffs 
charged equal the model discussed in subchapter 8.4.2. As the level of the tariff allows for a profitable 
development of the resources, it is not necessary for the Norwegian government to require a lower 
return than private investors. We believe that staring to develop an infrastructure solution is the most 
feasible way to solve the timing paradox. Our interviews with the O&G companies indicate that an 
infrastructure solution will trigger the exploration, “if the industry knew that it would be an 
infrastructure in place, there would be more exploration” (Tjensvoll, interview, 06.02.2015). 
 
In conclusion, we believe that state financing could solve the timing paradox. By ensuring the O&G 
companies that an infrastructure solution will be developed, more exploration and consequently more 
discoveries will follow, assuming that the NPD’s resource estimates proves accurate. Whether state 
financing for this project is politically doable is uncertain. The Norwegian government’s funding of the 
gas pipeline can appear as form of selective business support that would require strong arguments in 
order to be justifiable. Whether the arguments presented in this thesis will convince opponents that this 
is not a subsidy, as the Norwegian government requires the same return as private investors, is 
uncertain.   
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Table 22 – Cost and capacity comparison of various pipeline projects: 
Gassco (Undated) Langeled, Avaliable at: https://www.gassco.no/en/our-activities/pipelines-and-
platforms/langeled/ 
BSGI report (2014), see avove 
Hadash, Ronan (11.11.13), LNG – Pipeline – CNG Amirim Management LP, Avaliable at: 
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The Interviews 
List of Interview Respondents 
 
Name Company Position 
Dag Omre Centrica Resources  Senior Vice President 
Øyvind Rummelhoff ConocoPhillips  Commercial Manager 
Per Aage Jacobsen DNB Senior Vice President, DNB Project Finance and Advisory 
Håkon Hammer DNB DNB Markets Investment Banking Division 
Suzana Jensen Dong Energy EP  Commercial Manager 
Rasmus Jacobsen Dong Energy EP  Commercial Advisor 
Bjørn Tore Viste Solheim Eon General Manager Commercial 
Arve Tjensvoll Eon Manager Business Development 
Arve Ouff Eon Tax Specialist 
Tor Eirik Medbøen Faroe Petroleum Group Manager Economics and Planning 
Tore Torvund Former StatoilHydro Executive Vice President Exploration and Production 
Britt Aarhus Gassco Project Manager 
Ola Nestaas Gassco Advisor 
Maria Moræus Hansen GdF Suez EP Managing Director 
Geir Pettersen GdF Suez EP Special Advisor - External Consultant 
Tommy Hansen Norsk Olje og Gass Director Communication and Government Relations 
Andreas Treichell OMV Asset Development Manager 
John Bogen OMV Commercial Operations Manager 
Kurt Georgsen Silex Gas Chief Executive Officer 
Trygve Pedersen Solveig Gas Chief Executive Officer 
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Information About the Interview Presented to the Respondents 
 
Erling Hammer & Tord S. Torvund 
Norwegian School of Economics 
February 2015 
Information regarding the interview 
Dear XXX  
In connection with our master thesis in financial economics at the Norwegian School of Economics, we 
wish to conduct a series of interviews with important players in the Norwegian oil and gas industry. In the 
interviews we wish to address challenges and opportunities for further developments of Barents Sea 
natural gas resources. With respect to our research it is important for the quality of our thesis to conduct 
interviews with key decision makers and experts in the industry.   
 
The process of the interview 
The estimated time of each interview is approximately two hours, and is done only with signatories 
present. During the interviews we would prefer to use a tape recorder to ensure correctness of the data 
collected and allow us to concentrate more on the conversations. It is up to each individual respondent to 
determine what questions they wish to answer.  
 
Kind Regards,  
Erling Hammer and Tord S. Torvund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
107 
 
Declaration of Consent Presented to Respondents 
 
Master Thesis within Masters in Science 
Norwegian School of Economics 
February 2015 
 
 
 
 
Authors: Erling A. Hammer and Tord S. Torvund 
Supervisor: Associate Professor Tommy Stamland 
 
I hereby confirm that I understand the research topic of Erling A. Hammer’s and Tord S. Torvund’s 
master thesis in financial economics at the Norwegian School of Economics, and herby consent to the 
following: 
 
 
- Participation in interview with Erling Hammer and Tord Torvund 
- Recording of the interview 
- Transcription of the interviews in its entirety  
- That both the writers and supervisor have access to the transcription in its entirety in the 
repercussion of the interview 
- That I may be quoted from the interview in the master thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I confirm that my participation in the interview is voluntary 
 
 
………………………………… 
 
………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
Location/date       Location/date  
 
…………………………………      ……………………………………  
Erling A. Hammer      Tord S. Torvund 
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The Interview Guide 
 
Questions for O&G companies – 1st round of interviews 
 
Market Conditions: 
 Natural gas consumption in Europe has gone down the recent years, does this effect the 
attractiveness of further developing Norwegian gas resources? 
 How does the emergence of gas hubs and decreasing share of long-term commitments effect 
the dynamics of natural gas developments?  
 Do you think political ambitions in the EU to reduce carbon emissions will be important for 
natural gas demand going forward? 
 What do you think about global natural gas prices? Will they converge and what will be the 
equilibrium?  
 What do role do you think natural gas will have in Europe’s energy mix going forward? 
 Is the delinking between oil and gas prices in some way attractive for you as an E&P company? 
Considering that it reduces the exposure to the oil price?   
 New innovation in natural gas production, like FLNG, is that reducing the attractiveness of 
further developing Norwegian natural gas? 
 
Regulatory 
 How do you see the regulatory risk in Norway with regards to the changes in the petroleum tax 
system in 2013? 
 Is opening of Lofoten and Vesterålen important for the further development of the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf? 
 Does the petroleum tax system need to change in order to trigger further developments of 
natural gas resources? 
The Barents Sea 
 What needs to come first – a plan for a shared infrastructure or more exploration and 
resources? 
 Should the Norwegian government incentivize developments in the Barents Sea by adjusting the 
tax system (i.e special allowances that have been introduced on the British Continental Shelf)? 
 Pipeline or LNG form the Barents Sea?   
 Does the lack of infrastructure in the Barents Sea reduce your willingness to explore natural gas 
prospects in the region?  
 Is it oil that is driving the exploration in the Barents Sea? 
 Can associated gas in oilfields be a trigger for developing gas infrastructure from the region? 
 Is it possible that several small fields can establish a shared infrastructure? Or do you need one 
large discovery to trigger a potential investment? 
 Is global natural gas prices an important factor when it comes to considering exploration for 
natural gas in the Barents Sea?  
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Questions for O&G companies – 2st round of interviews 
- Would your company be willing to make contractual commitments (book “use it or loose it” 
transportation rights) in an infrastructure system from the Barents Sea at this time. 
- If making early commitments were given a discount, would this change the situation? 
- How low do you think is the tariff in a potential new infrastructure would need to be in order to 
make natural gas developments attractive? 
 
Additional Questions for Solveig Gas and Silex Gas regarding their investments in Gassled and thoughts 
about new infrastructure from the Barents Sea: 
 How has the regulatory changes in tariffs effected your willingness to invest in gas infrastructure 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf?  
 Could you also invest in other gas infrastructure solutions than pipelines? 
 How do you evaluate an investment opportunity, what is your risk reward preferences and risk 
tolerance?  
Additional Questions for DNB regarding project finance: 
 What will be a reasonable debt/equity ratio for this project? How is the capital structure 
decided in project finance? 
 What is the typical repayment structure and what margin over LIBOR would you need to pay? 
 What type of debt would be involved? Commercial bank loans/syndicates, Export credit 
agencies, bonds? 
 Is it a problem that the loan is not secured in a liquid/exchangeable asset? 
 How far above over the “secure cash flow” can the preferred equity carry? 
 How is the share of equity in the SPV distributed among the sponsors?   
Additional Questions for Tore Torvund regarding cost of field development: 
 What are the major components of the field development cost? 
 How does the size of the field effect the total cost of developing a field? 
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Project Status Categories  
(All information in this retrieved from NPS’ resource classification (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
2015g)) 
Category 0 Sold and delivered petroleum  
Petroleum resources in deposits that have been produced and have passed the reserves reference 
point. It includes quantities from fields in production as well as from fields that have been permanently 
closed down. 
 
Category 1 Reserves in production 
Remaining, recoverable, marketable and deliverable quantities of petroleum which the licensees have 
decided to recover, and which are covered by plans for development and operation (PDO) which the 
authorities have approved or granted exemption from. Should production be temporarily shut down, 
the reserves must, nevertheless, be added to this category. The reserves in this category are shown by 
subtracting the sold and delivered petroleum quantities from the originally recoverable reserves. 
Quantities of gas covered by approved plans for development and operation and on hold in fields from 
which delivery has started are also reckoned as reserves in this category. 
 
Category 2 Reserves with an approved plan for development and operation  
Category 2 F  
Recoverable quantities of petroleum described under category 1, but which have not been put into 
production. 
Category 2 A  
Additional (or deducted) reserves that are in categories 1 or 2F, which are a consequence of projects to 
improve production, and which have the same status as regards decisions as reserves in category 2F.  
 
Category 3 Reserves which the licensees have decided to recover  
Category 3 F  
Recoverable, marketable and deliverable quantities of petroleum which the licensees have decided to 
recover, but for which the authorities have not yet approved a PDO or granted exemption therefrom. 
This category also contains supplementary reserves from new deposits with the same status as regards 
decisions, and which can be connected to fields in categories 1 and 2. 9 The category also covers 
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quantities of petroleum (mainly gas) that have been held back, but which can be sold without significant 
investments at a later date.  
Category 3 A  
Additional (or deducted) quantities of petroleum in categories 1, 2 or 3F, which are a consequence of 
projects to improve production and which the licensees have decided to recover, but for which the 
authorities have not yet approved a PDO or granted exemption therefrom. The category also covers 
quantities of petroleum (mainly gas) that have been held back, but which can be sold without significant 
investments at a later date.  
 
Category 4 Resources in the planning phase  
Category 4 F  
Discovered, recoverable, petroleum resources that are expected to be covered by a PDO or granted 
exemption therefrom, and where specific activity is taking place with a view to clarifying whether a 
development will be implemented. Development is expected to be decided by the licensees within 
about 4 years. This category also contains supplementary resources which can be connected to existing 
fields that have reserves in categories 1 and 2, and discoveries that have reserves in category 3.  
Category 4 A  
Additional (or deducted) quantities of petroleum in categories 1, 2, 3 or 4F, which are a consequence of 
projects to improve production and which have the same status as regards decisions as resources in 
category 4F.  
 
Category 5 Resources whose recovery is likely, but not clarified 
Category 5 F  
Discovered, recoverable petroleum resources whose recovery is likely, but not clarified. This category 
contains discovered, recoverable petroleum resources which are not being considered for development 
at the moment, but which can be developed in due course. It also contains supplementary resources 
from new deposits which can be tied in to fields and discoveries with resources in categories 1, 2, 3 and 
4, but where matters regarding recovery have still not been clarified.  
Category 5 A  
Additional (or deducted) quantities of petroleum that are in categories 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5F, which are a 
consequence of projects to improve production, and which have the same status as regards decisions as 
resources in category 5F.  
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Category 6 Resources whose recovery is not very likely  
Discovered, recoverable petroleum resources which are not expected to be profitably recoverable even 
in the long term, and resources in small, untested discoveries whose recovery seems unlikely. Option 
values will normally be included in assessments of profitability. The option values emerge as a result of 
uncertainties surrounding future recovery factors (price, technology, etc.), and where recovery of the 
resource is considered to be an option (a right, but not an obligation) that will be realised only if the 
situation develops sufficiently favourably. This category contains petroleum resources that require 
substantial changes in technology, prices, etc., to be recovered profitably, and where it is not very likely 
that the changes required will take place.  
 
Category 7 Resources that have not been evaluated  
Category 7 F  
Recoverable petroleum resources in new discoveries where the discovery evaluation report have not yet 
been submitted to the authorities so that only a provisional resource estimate exists. 
Category 7 A  
Recoverable petroleum resources in fields and discoveries which have resources in categories 1, 2, 3, 4 
or 5 and which may be recoverable with the help of production techniques beyond those that are 
considered to be conventional, or with the help of known methods which there is still no basis for 
employing. For the individual field or discovery, this estimate of the resource will typically be based on 
rough valuations. There may be great uncertainty as to whether the measures can be implemented. 
Estimates are normally only stated for the total potential of the measures, not in respect of individual 
measures. (This category covers resources, which were previously categorised as "Resources from 
possible future measures to increase the recovery factor").  
 
Category 8 Resources in prospects 
Undiscovered, recoverable quantities of petroleum in mapped prospects that have not been discovered 
by drilling. It is uncertain whether the estimated resources are present. They have been risk-weighted, 
i.e. they reflect estimated volumes multiplied by the probability of making a discovery. This probability 
must be stated.  
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Category 9 Resources in leads, and unmapped resources  
Undiscovered, recoverable petroleum resources attached to leads. It is uncertain whether the leads, and 
if so the estimated resources, are actually present. The resource estimates reflect estimated volumes 
multiplied by the probability of making a discovery. This probability must be stated. The unmapped, 
recoverable resources are calculated by analysing plays. The total resources of the plays include both 
discovered and undiscovered resources. The unmapped resources are the difference between the 
aggregate resources of the plays and the discovered and mapped resources. 
Conversion table 
 
Conversions    
1 Sm3 of oil =1.0 Sm3 o.e.  
1 Sm3 of condensate =1.0 Sm3 o.e.  
1000 Sm3 of gas =1.0 Sm3 o.e.  
Gas     
1 cubic foot 1,000.00 BTU 
1 cubic metre 9,000.00 kcal 
1 cubic metre 35.30 cubic feet 
1 cubic metre 0.0367 Mbtu 
Crude Oil     
1 Sm3 6.29 barrels 
1 Sm3 0.84 toe 
1 tonne 7.49 barrels 
1 barrel 159.00 litres 
 
 
 
MJ kWh TKE TOE 
Sm3 natural 
gas 
Barrel 
crude oil   
1 MJ, megajoul 1 0.278 0.0000341 0.0000236 0.0281 0.000176 
1 kwh kilowat hour 3.6 1 0.000123 0.000085 0.0927 0.000365 
1 TKE, tonne coal equivalent 29300 8140 1 0.69 825 5.18 
1 TOE, tonne oil equivalent 42300 11788 1.44 1 1190 7.49 
1 Sm3 natural gas 40 9.87 0.00121 0.00084 1 0.00629 
1 barrel crude oil 5650 1569 0.193 0.134 159 1 
 
